- Who prevails?
Answer: Dana, because a judgment lien does not sever a joint tenancy and Carlos's interest terminated at his death before any forced sale.
Whenever you see a joint tenancy with a creditor of one co-tenant, focus on survivorship: each joint tenant holds an undivided interest with a right of survivorship, and that interest is not freely alienable by will but can be severed during life. The key question is whether anything happened before death to sever Carlos's interest.
Here, the creditor only recorded a judgment lien against Carlos's interest. A judgment lien does not sever a joint tenancy. Carlos died before any execution or forced sale, so his interest vanished at death and Dana became sole owner by survivorship. Therefore, Dana prevails free of the lien.
The choice saying Dana prevails only if she pays the creditor is wrong because the lien never attached to a surviving interest—Carlos's share ceased to exist at death, so there is no debt to pay from the property. The choice saying the creditor prevails because a valid lien survives the debtor's death is also wrong: that general rule applies to property the debtor owned at death, but Carlos had no ownable interest left after survivorship. Finally, the choice saying recording the judgment lien severed the joint tenancy and encumbers the entire property is wrong because severance requires something more, like a conveyance, partition, or execution sale during life—a mere lien does not destroy survivorship.
Study tip: on real-property questions, separate "lien attached" from "severance occurred." A lien may attach to a joint tenant's interest, but if no forced sale happens before death, survivorship wins.
- Who owns Blackacre?
Answer: Otis and Gail each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common.
This question tests the doctrine of severance in joint tenancy. Remember, a joint tenancy requires the four unities—time, title, interest, and possession. Any act that breaks one of these unities, such as a conveyance, a mortgage, or a creditor's execution sale, severs the joint tenancy as to that owner's interest.
Here, Edna and Frank are joint tenants. When Otis buys Edna's interest at the sheriff's sale, the joint tenancy is severed as to Edna's share. Otis and Frank now own Blackacre as tenants in common, each holding an undivided one-half. Critically, the right of survivorship is destroyed. When Frank later dies, his one-half interest does not pass to Otis or Edna by survivorship; instead, it passes through his estate to his devisee, Gail. Therefore, Otis and Gail each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common.
Now consider the wrong answers. "Otis and Edna each own an undivided one-half" is incorrect because Edna's interest was sold at the execution sale; she retains nothing, and Frank's share goes to Gail, not Edna. "Gail owns the entire fee simple by right of survivorship" is wrong because the execution sale severed the joint tenancy, eliminating the right of survivorship; Gail only inherits Frank's one-half. Finally, "Otis owns the entire fee simple because the execution sale terminated Frank's right of survivorship" is a trap—while the sale did terminate Frank's right of survivorship, it did not terminate his ownership interest. Frank retained his one-half, which now passes to Gail.
Study tip: Whenever a joint tenant's interest is involuntarily transferred (via execution, bankruptcy, or partition), that interest is severed, converting the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. The remaining joint tenant's share will pass by will or intestacy, not by survivorship. Watch for this on the bar exam—it's a frequent trap.
- Will Gina prevail on her claims?
Answer: No, because the quarry was an open mine when the cotenancy began and Frank's continuation of the existing operation in the same manner is not waste.
When you see one co-tenant extracting minerals or timber from commonly owned land, your first thought should be the law of waste—and its important exception for "open mines." If the extraction was already underway when the cotenancy began, a co-tenant may continue the established operation in substantially the same manner without being liable for waste.
Here, Frank and Gina inherited a quarry their father had operated for decades. That made it an open mine at the start of the cotenancy. Frank continued the same type of operation, complied with industry standards, and did not accelerate depletion. Therefore his extraction is not waste, and Gina cannot enjoin it or recover waste damages. This is exactly what the correct choice says: the open-mine exception controls.
The first wrong choice incorrectly states a flat rule that a co-tenant may never extract minerals for personal profit; that ignores the open-mine exception. The second wrong choice treats any permanent reduction in value as waste, but continuing an established use is not waste under this doctrine. The last wrong choice is tempting but misstates the remedy: Frank does not owe Gina the fair market value of the gravel removed, and the court will not enjoin him. At most, Gina may be entitled to an accounting for her share of net profits from the quarry, but that is not a waste claim.
Study tip: when you see "waste" and "mine," check whether the mine was open before the cotenancy began—that single fact often decides the answer.
- How much must Rachel pay Sam?
Answer: $19,500
Whenever you see a co-tenant accounting question, think: rents from third parties are shared, common expenses are shared, and—unless there was an ouster—an occupying co-tenant owes nothing for personal use. Rachel and Sam are tenants in common with presumed equal shares. Rachel collected $60,000 in rent from the leased units, so that income must be accounted for. She also paid $12,000 in necessary repairs and $9,000 in property taxes—both common expenses chargeable to the co-tenancy. So the net common fund is:
60,000−12,000−9,000=39,000
Sam's equal half is $19,500. Rachel can offset his refused share of the expenses against the rent she owes him, which is why that amount is correct.
The $24,000 choice subtracts only the repairs and ignores the property taxes. The $25,500 choice subtracts only the property taxes and ignores the repairs. The $30,000 choice takes half of the gross rents and gives no credit for necessary expenses at all. The detail that Rachel did not exclude Sam or deny him access is also crucial: there was no ouster, so she does not owe Sam rent for the unit she personally occupies.
Study tip: for co-tenant accounting, use the formula "third-party rents minus common expenses, then split by ownership share," and always check for ouster facts before considering rent for self-occupancy. - Which legal issue is most important in resolving whether the bank may foreclose?
Answer: Whether Ana's mortgage of her interest severed the joint tenancy before her death.
Whenever a joint tenant acts alone to mortgage her interest, focus immediately on whether that act severed the joint tenancy. In most jurisdictions, a joint tenant's mortgage of her interest severs the joint tenancy, at least as to that interest. Because Ana mortgaged her interest before death, the joint tenancy was likely broken; Ben and the bank then held interests as tenants in common. After Ana died, Ben did not automatically take Ana's former share by survivorship—that share was already encumbered. The bank may foreclose on Ana's former interest.
Why not the other choices? Ben's survivorship interest does not "relate back" to the original purchase and outrank the mortgage; survivorship is defeated by any severance that occurs before death. Ana's sister also did not succeed to Ana's right of survivorship—a right of survivorship is not an inheritable asset, and it disappears if severance occurred. The bank's failure to foreclose during Ana's lifetime did not extinguish its mortgage; a mortgagee may foreclose after the mortgagor's death against the successor to the encumbered interest.
Study tip: when a joint tenant mortgages or conveys her interest, ask "severance before death?" If yes, survivorship is destroyed and the mortgage survives against that interest.
- What may Ursula recover from Tom?
Answer: $12,000, representing her one-half share of the fair rental value for the twelve months after the ouster.
This question tests the rights of cotenants to collect rent from each other. When tenants in common occupy property, one co-tenant is generally not liable to the other for fair rental value merely for living there — unless the occupying co-tenant has ousted the other or there was an agreement to pay rent. Here, the key is identifying when the ouster occurred.
For the first two years, Tom lived in the house but Ursula visited and raised no objection. That was not an ouster, so Tom owes nothing for that period. At the beginning of the third year, however, Tom changed the locks and wrote that Ursula was no longer welcome. That unequivocally excluded her, and she stayed away because of it. From that point, Tom became liable to Ursula for her share of the fair rental value: one-half of $2,000 per month for 12 months, which is $12,000.
The $72,000 full fair rental value for the entire three years is wrong because it ignores the lack of ouster during the first two years and gives Ursula the full value rather than her share. The $24,000 full fair rental value for only the twelve months after ouster is closer but still mistakes the remedy: Tom owes Ursula only her one-half share, not the entire rental value. The $36,000 one-half share for the entire three years wrongly treats the first two years as an ouster despite Ursula's consent and visits.
On cotenancy questions, first locate the ouster, then apply the co-tenant's ownership fraction only from that date forward.
- Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether Elena may recover those expenditures in the partition?
Answer: Whether the mortgage, tax, and roof-replacement expenses are chargeable against Theo's share in the partition.
When you see a partition action between co-tenants, the central battle is usually financial fairness: who paid what to preserve the property, and how that should be offset against sale proceeds. That's why this question tests contribute and accounting in partition, not title disputes.
Elena's claim depends on whether mortgage payments, property taxes, and roof replacement are expenses chargeable against Theo's share in a partition by sale. As a tenant in common, Elena may seek equitable contribution from Theo for disproportionate payment of expenses necessary to preserve the common property—such as carrying costs and necessary repairs. If those expenditures qualify, a partition court can reimburse her from Theo's share before splitting proceeds; if not, the claim fails. Thus this legal issue is decisive.
Theo's twelve-year delay does not bar his partition right; co-tenants generally may seek partition at any time absent unusual laches, and mere delay without prejudice rarely suffices. Elena's labor and time managing farm are a different claim—absent an agreement, courts generally do not compensate a co-tenant for personal services, even if valuable; that would be unjust enrichment reasoning, not a contribution offset. Elena's long possession was not adverse—as a tenant in common, she is already legally entitled to possess the whole, and her use did not become hostile to Theo unless she ousted him or clearly repudiated his title. Paying taxes and repairs, alone, does not start adverse possession against a co-tenant.
Study takeaway: in partition problems, first categorize expenditures—necessary carrying costs and repairs are contribution-eligible; improvements and personal labor are handled differently—then ask whether the court can charge the non-paying co-tenant's share, not whether delay or adverse possession changed title.
- Which allocation of the sale proceeds is correct?
Answer: A receives $352,500; B receives $247,500.
When you see a partition sale between tenants in common, focus on two things: whether an ouster occurred (which would create a rent obligation) and how to adjust the proceeds for contributions. Here, B never demanded access and A never refused, so there is no ouster—A owes no rent for his occupancy. A is entitled to reimbursement for the property taxes ($40,000) and the necessary roof repair ($30,000) because these are common expenses that benefited the entire property. For the bathroom improvement, A is only entitled to the lesser of the cost ($50,000) or the increase in value ($35,000), so the credit is $35,000. Total reimbursement: $40,000 + $30,000 + $35,000 = $105,000. Subtract this from the $600,000 sale price, leaving $495,000, which is split equally: $247,500 each. A receives his half plus the $105,000 credit, totaling $352,500, while B receives $247,500.
The option giving A $317,500 only credits the $35,000 improvement increase, ignoring the taxes and roof. The option giving A $335,000 credits only half of the taxes and repairs (treating them as contribution for the other's share) plus the full improvement—but the correct method is to reimburse the full amount paid for common expenses and then divide the remainder. The option giving A $302,500 incorrectly subtracts $50,000 (half the fair rental value) from A's share, assuming he owes rent, but without ouster, no rent is due.
Study tip: For partition, remember "no ouster, no rent." Add all reimbursable expenses, subtract from the sale price, then split the remainder equally.
- Which additional fact, if true, would be most important in determining whether Logan may recover a share of the fair rental value?
Answer: At the start of the five summers, Mia told Logan he was not welcome and would be trespassing if he came.
Whenever a co-tenant who did not occupy the property seeks rent from the one who did, the key issue is ouster. A co-tenant in possession generally owes nothing for mere exclusive use, because every tenant in common has an equal right to possess. Rent liability arises only when the occupant wrongfully excludes the other from the property. That is why the strongest fact is that Mia told Logan he was not welcome and would be trespassing if he came. That explicit denial of Logan's right to enter turns Mia's exclusive use into an ouster, making Logan's claim for half the fair rental value viable. The fact that Logan sent letters saying he planned to visit but Mia never replied is not enough: planning to visit does not demand possession, and failing to reply is not the same as refusing entry. Mia's belief that Logan was too busy or uninterested is also irrelevant; ouster depends on conduct, not her subjective impressions. Finally, Logan's statements that he would not use the house but was not surrendering his ownership interest merely preserved his title; voluntary nonuse, without exclusion, creates no right to rent. On questions like this, always start by asking, "Was there an ouster?" Distinguish mere exclusive occupancy from affirmative conduct excluding the other co-tenant.
- Who owns Greenacre, and what interests, if any, do First Bank and Vic have?
Answer: Wendy owns Greenacre in fee simple; First Bank's mortgage is void; Vic has a judgment lien on the one-half interest Hal owned after the divorce.
Whenever you see a tenancy by the entirety, track events in order: marriage, one spouse's attempted encumbrance, creditor judgments, divorce, then death. Here, while Hal and Wendy were married, Hal alone gave First Bank a mortgage. Under the Act, a sole spouse may not encumber entirety property, so that mortgage is void from the start. Vic's judgment against Hal also did not attach during the marriage, because a judgment lien against one spouse does not attach to entirety property. The divorce was the turning point: the Act converted the entirety into a tenancy in common and made Vic's lien attach to Hal's one-half as of the date of dissolution. Hal then died, so his one-half passed by will to Wendy—but it passed subject to Vic's already attached lien. Wendy therefore owns Greenacre in fee simple, and Vic has a judgment lien on the one-half interest Hal owned after the divorce.
The answer saying Vic has no interest because Hal's property passed to Wendy by will is wrong: a transfer by will does not extinguish a valid judgment lien. The answer saying Wendy and Vic own as tenants in common is wrong because Vic has only a lien, not ownership. And the answer making Wendy subject to First Bank's mortgage is wrong because the Act explicitly makes Hal's unauthorized mortgage void, so it cannot later "attach" when the estate changes form.
On the exam, remember: divorce is the event that lets a sole spouse's creditors attach, but it never resurrects a void encumbrance.
- How should the court rule on the partition action?
Answer: Order sale, because division would substantially reduce the aggregate fair market value of the property, which constitutes great prejudice under the Act.
Whenever you see a partition action, remember that partition in kind is the default—the law favors keeping land physically divided among co-owners. But the default yields when partition would cause "great prejudice" to any co-owner, and the statute defines great prejudice to include a substantial reduction in the aggregate fair market value of the property. That is exactly what happens here: dividing 160 acres into four 40-acre parcels drops total value from $1,600,000 to $1,000,000—a $600,000, or 37.5%, loss. The court found division physically possible, but physical possibility alone does not control because the prejudice of destroying $600,000 in value is substantial. Therefore the court should order a sale.
The choices proposing partition in kind miss this. The choice saying land can be divided into four equal parcels, and Claire and Dan's preference cannot override Ann and Ben's rights, ignores the statutory great-prejudice exception: a substantial aggregate value reduction overrides the normal preference. The choice recommending partition in kind "with owelty" also fails: owelty only equalizes differences in value between allotted parcelsl—it does not compensate for the overall $600,000 loss to all co-owners. Finally, the choice claiming a co-tenant may compel a sale whenever another objects to co-ownership misstates the law: the act expressly says that majority favor of sale or objection to partition in kind is not alone sufficient; a sale requires showing great prejudice, which is present here for a different reason.
Study tip: On partition questions, first ask whether antipartition-in-kind barrier is present—often a "substantial reduction in aggregate fair market value" is the decisive statutory trigger, regardless of how fairly the land could be split.
- Who owns the beach house?
Answer: Ivan owns the entire property, because Hana's unilateral deed did not sever the tenancy by the entirety and Ivan took Hana's share by right of survivorship at her death.
Whenever you see married owners and a unilateral deed, think about whether the estate is protected from severance. A tenancy by the entirety is a form of co-ownership available only to spouses, and neither spouse can convey or encumber the property without the other's consent. Hana's deed did not sever that tenancy because the unities—especially the unity of person—remained intact. So during Hana's life, Lila received no transferable present interest. When Hana died, the survivorship feature automatically gave Ivan her share, meaning Ivan owns the entire beach house.
Why are the others wrong? The choice saying Ivan and Lila each own one-half as tenants in common assumes Hana had an alienable one-half interest. She did not: a tenant by the entirety owns the whole, not a separate share, and cannot unilaterally break that estate. The life-estate/remainder option wrongly treats Hana's survivorship right as a separately conveyable thing; survivorship rights in a tenancy by the entirety are not severable or transferable to a third party. Finally, the choice giving Lila entire ownership misunderstands survivorship: Hana could not transfer a survivorship interest that would ripen at death, because Ivan's right of survivorship was equal and superior, and Hana's death did not cut off Ivan's interest.
Study tip: remember "spouses are one person" in a tenancy by the entirety—unilateral action fails. Contrast with a joint tenancy, which one owner can unilaterally sever.
- Who owns Blackacre, and what rights, if any, does Dana have?
Answer: Carl owns Blackacre in fee simple, free of Dana's contract, but Dana may have a claim for breach or restitution against Alan's estate.
Whenever you see a joint tenancy question, the central issue is whether anything severed the tenancy before death. Here, the State Act controls: a contract to convey does not sever a joint tenancy, and if the contracting joint tenant dies before delivering a deed, the contract is not enforceable against the surviving joint tenants. Alan's signed contract with Dana gave Dana only an expectancy, not an interest in Blackacre. Because Alan died before closing and without conveying, his share passed by survivorship to Beth and Carl, not to Dana. When Beth later died, her share passed to Carl. Therefore, Carl owns Blackacre in fee simple, and Dana is left with a claim against Alan's estate for breach or restitution.
The wrong answers each misread the statute. Saying the contract operated as an equitable severance before Alan's death ignores Section 2(a), which explicitly rejects equitable severance by contract. Saying Dana can enforce specific performance against surviving joint tenants contradicts Section 2(b), which bars enforcement against them. And saying Dana owns an undivided one-third interest as a tenant in common wrongly treats Alan's contracted share as having left the joint tenancy; it did not.
Study tip: when a statute defines the exclusive way to sever a joint tenancy, apply it literally. Do not import equitable-conversion reasoning unless the statute allows it. A contract alone is usually a claim against the estate, not a path to the land.
- Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether the lender may execute on the home?
Answer: Whether a judgment against only one spouse may be enforced against property held as tenants by entirety.
Whenever you see a question about a married couple's property and one spouse's debt, your first move should be to identify the form of ownership. Here, the home is held as tenants by the entirety, a form reserved for married couples in which each spouse has an undivided interest and neither can alone sever the tenancy. That form of ownership is the key: a judgment against only one spouse generally cannot be enforced against property held by the entirety, because the debtor spouse has no separately reachable interest while the marriage continues. The lender's judgment is valid against Omar, but the home is not an asset the court may execute on to satisfy it.
The wrong answers each miss this central point. Saying the guaranty is chargeable to Renee because it was incurred during marriage confuses spousal liability with property rights; marriage alone does not make one spouse liable for the other's separate debts. Calling the home community property mischaracterizes it—tenants by the entirety is a form of co-ownership with survivorship, not community property. And arguing that Renee's lack of consent invalidates the judgment against Omar confuses the validity of the personal judgment with the reachability of specific property; Omar's promise binds him, but it still cannot expose the entirety property.
On exam day, remember: ask first who owns the property and what form that ownership takes, then ask what a creditor can actually reach. Tenancy by the entirety is a shield against one spouse's separate creditors.
- Who currently owns Greenacre?
Answer: D owns a one-third interest and Y owns a two-thirds interest, as tenants in common.
Whenever you see a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, remember the four unities (time, title, interest, possession) and that a unilateral conveyance by one joint tenant severs the joint tenancy as to that share only. Here, O's conveyance creates a joint tenancy among A, B, and C. When A conveys his interest to D, that severance breaks the joint tenancy as to A's share, making D a tenant in common with B and C, who remain joint tenants as between themselves. So D holds a 1/3 interest, and B and C jointly hold 2/3. When B dies, because B and C are still joint tenants, B's 1/3 passes to C by right of survivorship, not to X under B's will. Thus, C now holds the entire 2/3 share. When C dies, that 2/3 passes to Y through C's will. Therefore, D owns a 1/3 interest and Y owns a 2/3 interest, held as tenants in common. The choice saying D, X, and Y each own a one-third interest is wrong because X receives nothing—B's will is ineffective to pass the interest since survivorship operates at death. The choice giving X a two-thirds interest is wrong for the same reason. The choice naming A as an owner is wrong because A conveyed all interest to D, so A is out of the picture. Remember the key: a joint tenant's unilateral conveyance severs the joint tenancy only as to that share, but the remaining joint tenants continue to hold their shares with survivorship rights.
- How should the court distribute the sale proceeds?
Answer: Walt receives $141,000 and Xena receives $104,000.
Whenever you see a partition sale between co-tenants, remember that equal ownership is only the starting point. The court adjusts proceeds to prevent unjust enrichment and to honor necessary expenses. Walt's renovation increased the property's value by $45,000, so that is the amount Walt gets as a credit—not his $60,000 cost. The extra $15,000 was money spent that did not add value, and Xena should not have to pay for that. Xena's roof repair was necessary and she demanded contribution, so she receives her $8,000 even though the repair did not increase market value; necessary repairs can be reimbursed as common expenses.
Subtract those two credits from the $245,000 sale price: $245,000 − $45,000 − $8,000 = $192,000. Divide the remaining proceeds equally: $96,000 for each co-owner. Walt therefore receives $45,000 + $96,000 = $141,000, and Xena receives $8,000 + $96,000 = $104,000.
The "Walt receives $152,500 and Xena receives $92,500" split wrongly credits Walt for the full $60,000 renovation cost and ignores Xena's roof repair entirely. The "Walt receives $148,500 and Xena receives $96,500" split correctly credits Xena's repair but still overcompensates Walt for the renovation. The equal $122,500/$122,500 split ignores both credits. The $141,000/$104,000 division is correct because it limits improvements to actual value added while honoring necessary repairs. On exam day, ask: did the expense add lasting value, and was it necessary? That tells you which credits to apply before splitting the remainder.
- How should the court rule on the method of partition?
Answer: Partition the farm in kind, awarding Paula the west field and Quentin the east field, with Quentin required to pay Paula $60,000 to equalize the shares.
Whenever you see a partition question, remember that the law strongly favors partition in kind (physical division) over partition by sale. A sale is only ordered when a physical division cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners. Here, the farm consists of two contiguous 120-acre fields of comparable soil quality, so division in kind is feasible. The correct approach is to divide the land and adjust for any value disparity with an "owelty" payment.
The total farm is worth $480,000 ($300,000 + $180,000). Paula's 3/4 share is $360,000; Quentin's 1/4 is $120,000. If Paula gets the west field ($300,000) and Quentin gets the east field ($180,000), Paula is short $60,000 and Quentin is over by $60,000. So the court should award Paula the west field and Quentin the east field, but require Quentin to pay Paula $60,000 to equalize their shares.
Now consider the wrong answers. The choice stating that "any co-tenant may compel partition by sale whenever the parties cannot agree" is wrong because sale is a last resort, not a right triggered by mere disagreement—you must show great prejudice to justify a sale. The choice with "no cash payment" is wrong because it would leave Paula with $300,000 and Quentin with $180,000, failing to reflect their 3/4 and 1/4 interests; owelty is needed to achieve fairness. The choice denying the petition entirely is wrong because partition is available to any co-tenant regardless of whether shares are equal—exact proportional division isn't required since owelty can compensate.
Your study tip: on the bar exam, if the property is physically divisible, choose partition in kind and look for an owelty payment to fix unequal values. Sale is only proper when division would destroy the property's utility or value.
- What is Paul entitled to recover?
Answer: One-half of the fair rental value of the property from the date Olivia refused Paul entry, offset by Paul's one-half share of taxes and roof-repair costs Olivia paid during that period, but not by dock/landscaping costs.
Whenever you see a cotenancy question, start by identifying whether an ouster occurred and when. Under the State Cotenancy Act, a tenant in common is ordinarily not liable for rent for occupancy, but an ousted cotenant may recover fair rental value once the ousting cotenant denies the right to possession and refuses a demand for entry.
Here, Olivia's email claiming the house as hers alone was a denial, but Paul's demand for entry was not refused until Olivia changed the locks and turned him away. That refusal is the date ouster began. Paul is therefore entitled to one-half of the fair rental value from that date, not from her initial occupancy or her earlier email claim. Olivia may offset Paul's one-half share of property taxes and necessary roof repairs paid during the ouster period, because the statute expressly allows offsets for taxes and necessary repairs. The dock and landscaping are improvements, and the statute says no offset for improvements, even if they add value.
The choice saying Paul gets rent from the date Olivia first occupied the property is wrong because pre-ouster occupancy is free, not rent-producing. The choice starting recovery from Olivia's email is wrong because ouster required both denial and refused demand; the demand was not refused until Paul arrived. The choice saying Paul gets nothing is wrong because ouster gives him a statutory remedy despite the general rule that each cotenant may possess the whole.
Study tip: on ouster questions, anchor the timeline to the actual refusal of entry, then apply the statutory offsets strictly—taxes and necessary repairs yes, improvements no.
