- Under § 15-9, what amount may P recover from D2?
Answer: $50,000, because D2 is severally liable for its 25% share and P's fault is compared with the combined 60% fault of D1 and D2.
When you see a comparative fault statute alongside a settlement, your brain should immediately lock onto two distinct rules: the barring threshold (comparing the claimant to everyone else combined) and the several liability rule (each defendant pays only their own percentage, with no reallocation of settled shares).
Here, P's 40% fault is not greater than the combined 60% fault of D1 and D2, so the claim against D2 is not barred. Because the statute explicitly states that fault attributed to a settling person is never reallocated, D2 is liable only for its own 25% share. Calculating that share gives you 200,000×25%=$50,000, which D2 must pay. The fact that P already settled with D1 for $70,000 is irrelevant to D2's several liability calculation under this statute.
Now, address the traps. The choice saying "Nothing, because P's 40% fault is greater than D2's 25% fault" misreads the statute—it compares P against the combined fault of all others, not just the remaining defendant. The choice claiming D2 must pay the combined 60% ($120,000) directly violates subsection (c)'s prohibition on reallocating the settled person's fault. Finally, the choice for the full $200,000 wrongly assumes comparative fault evaporates when one defendant settles; the statute specifically contemplates settlements and still applies the jury's fault percentages.
Your study tip: when a comparative fault statute has a settlement, always run two separate calculations—first check if P is barred (P vs. all others), then calculate the defendant's share (defendant % × damages). Never let a settlement inflate a non-settling defendant's liability. - Which legal issue is most directly raised by the evidence about the seatbelt?
Answer: Comparative negligence, because the driver's failure to wear a seatbelt contributed to the severity of her injuries.
Whenever you see evidence about the plaintiff's own conduct in a tort case, ask two questions: Did the conduct contribute to the accident itself, or only to the injuries? And did it happen before or after the collision? Here, the seatbelt evidence raises the issue of plaintiff fault before the accident: the driver's failure to wear a seatbelt did not cause the collision, but it made her injuries worse.
That makes comparative negligence, because the driver's failure to wear a seatbelt contributed to the severity of her injuries, the correct choice. Under comparative negligence, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the percentage her own fault contributed to the harm. Many jurisdictions apply this "seatbelt defense" to reduce damages when the failure to buckle up worsened the injury.
Avoidable consequences, because the driver failed to mitigate damages after the collision is wrong because avoidable consequences concerns post-accident conduct, like failing to seek medical treatment or unreasonably increasing damages after the injury occurred. Not wearing a seatbelt is pre-accident conduct.
Assumption of risk, because the driver knew seatbelts reduce the risk of injury is wrong because assumption of risk requires knowingly and voluntarily encountering a known danger—not merely knowing that seatbelts protect you.
Superseding cause, because the lack of a seatbelt caused the injuries rather than the collision is wrong because the defendant's negligence was still the cause of the collision; the lack of a seatbelt aggravated the injuries but did not break the causal chain.
Study tip: distinguish "failure to mitigate after" from "contributing fault before"—that timing is the key to this exam trap.
- Under the rule in Reyes, what amount should P recover?
Answer: $250,000, because P's recovery is reduced by his 75% fault and implied assumption of risk is not a separate bar.
Whenever you see a comparative negligence question, first identify whether the jurisdiction applies pure or modified rules. Under pure comparative negligence, any percentage of fault assigned to the defendant keeps the door open to recovery, even if the plaintiff is mostly at fault. In Reyes, that is exactly the rule: P's damages are reduced by P's own fault percentage, but not eliminated.
Here, the jury assigned P 75% fault and D 25%, with damages of $1,000,000. Pure comparative negligence reduces P's recovery by 75%, leaving $250,000. The key is that implied assumption of risk is abolished, so P's decision to dive despite the "No Diving" sign does not act as a separate complete defense. Instead, that knowing conduct is simply included in the 75% fault calculation. Primary assumption of risk is not at issue because D owed P a duty and breached it by failing to provide a lifeguard.
The "nothing because P's fault exceeds D's" answer describes the old contributory negligence or modified comparative fault rule, not the pure rule stated. The "nothing because P knowingly assumed risk" treats implied assumption of risk as an independent bar, which Reyes explicitly abolishes. The "$750,000 because D violated the regulation" ignores comparative fault; a statutory violation may establish breach, but it does not erase P's own negligence.
For the exam, remember: when implied assumption of risk is merged into comparative fault, never use it as a separate bar — simply fold the plaintiff's conduct into the percentage and reduce damages.
- Which defense is most likely to reduce the man's recovery?
Answer: Comparative negligence, because his failure to read the label contributed to his injury.
Whenever you see a product-defect claim based on an inadequate warning, separate two issues: was the warning defective, and did the plaintiff's own conduct contribute? In a comparative-fault jurisdiction, even if the warning was too weak to make the cleaner defective, the man's failure to read the label he did see can reduce his recovery proportionately.
The most likely defense is comparative negligence, because his injury occurred after he ignored an express instruction to use the product only in well-ventilated areas. His admitted failure to read the label was a cause of his dizziness and fall, so a jury could allocate a percentage of fault to him, reducing damages.
Express assumption of risk fails because he did not read the label, so he never knowingly agreed to accept the danger. Secondary implied assumption of risk also requires actual knowledge of the risk plus voluntary exposure; using a cleaner in a closed bathroom without reading warnings is not an informed choice. Contributory negligence is the old bar-to-recovery rule, and merely having a warning on the label does not automatically constitute contributory negligence—especially when the alleged defect is that the warning was not prominent enough.
Study tip: on torts questions, ask first whether the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the risk. If not, assumption of risk cannot apply; the likely defense is comparative negligence based on unreasonable failure to read or investigate.
- Which issue is most significant in evaluating the factory's defense that the worker assumed the risk?
Answer: Whether the worker's continued work was voluntary or compelled by fear of losing her job.
When you see an assumption-of-risk defense, focus on its two required elements: knowledge of the risk and voluntary acceptance of it. Here, the worker clearly knew the guard was missing—she complained about it—so the real dispute is whether she freely chose to keep working. That is why the most significant issue is whether her continued work was voluntary or compelled by fear of losing her job. If fear of termination left her no reasonable choice, a court is unlikely to find voluntary assumption of risk, and the defense fails. The fact that she knew the guard was missing is necessary but not enough, because knowledge alone does not prove consent. Whether she complained to anyone other than the supervisor is not central; complaints matter only as evidence of knowledge, and her knowledge is already established. Whether the supervisor's promise was written or oral is also irrelevant, since the defense turns on her choice and state of mind, not contract formalities. Finally, the choice framed as "voluntary or compelled" is the true crux: economic pressure can negate voluntariness, whereas a mere preference not to stop working would not. On the bar exam, whenever "assumed the risk" appears, separate knowledge from voluntariness and ask whether the plaintiff had a meaningful choice. That split will lead you to the most significant disputed issue.
- How much may Abe recover from Dee?
Answer: $200,000, because Cy's negligence is not imputed to Abe and Dee is jointly and severally liable for the whole injury.
A driver's negligence is not imputed to a passenger absent a joint enterprise or agency, so Abe, who was not negligent, recovers his full damages. Under joint and several liability, each defendant whose negligence caused an indivisible injury is liable for the entire amount, though a defendant who pays more than its share may seek contribution from the other tortfeasor. Dee is liable to Abe for the full $200,000 and may pursue Cy for contribution. The 60-percent answer confuses the apportionment of fault, which governs contribution between tortfeasors, with several liability, which the state has not adopted. The imputation answer applies an imputed-negligence rule that does not apply to an ordinary passenger. The must-sue-both answer invents a joinder requirement; a plaintiff may sue any jointly and severally liable defendant alone.
- Is Lou's claim against Max barred?
Answer: No, because contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based on the defendant's reckless conduct.
In jurisdictions that retain contributory negligence, a plaintiff's ordinary negligence bars recovery for the defendant's negligence, but not for the defendant's reckless, willful, or wanton conduct. The jury found Max reckless, so Lou's negligence does not bar his claim. The all-negligence answer states the general rule and ignores its limit for reckless conduct. The negligence-per-se answer changes nothing: per se negligence is still negligence, and it does not bar a claim based on recklessness. The minor-negligence answer applies comparative negligence, which the state has not adopted; in this state, Lou's claim is either barred or not, and it is not barred because Max was reckless.
- Under the rule in Velazquez, which statement best describes P's recovery?
Answer: P may recover full damages, because his voluntary encounter with the risk was a reasonable rescue and not fault.
When you see a rescue-injury question, start by asking whether the defendant negligently created the peril and whether the plaintiff's rescue attempt was reasonable. Here, D's mechanic negligently repaired the fuel line, causing the car to burst into flames and trapping the driver—so D created the peril. The rescue doctrine makes a rescuer a foreseeable plaintiff, meaning D owes a duty.
P's recovery is full because his decision to enter the burning car was a reasonable rescue. The rule in Velazquez says knowing and voluntary exposure to danger is treated as comparative fault only if the decision to encounter the risk was unreasonable. P knew the fire was dangerous, but the driver was trapped and P pulled him to safety—that is a classic reasonable rescue, not fault.
The "nothing, because P knowingly assumed the risk" choice misreads knowledge as consent. But implied assumption of risk is not an absolute bar when the rescue is reasonable. The "nothing, because rescuers are owed no duty" choice contradicts the rescue doctrine: voluntarily entering danger does not extinguish the duty; it is exactly the foreseeable harm the rule protects. The "damages reduced by percentage of fault" choice also fails because comparative fault applies only to unreasonable risk decisions, and P's choice was reasonable.
Study tip: on bar-exam torts questions, separate knowledge of danger from unreasonable assumption of risk. A rescuer's awareness of fire does not bar recovery—the pivotal question is whether the rescue itself was reasonable.
- Which legal doctrine is most directly raised by the employer's argument?
Answer: Comparative negligence, because the pedestrian's carelessness contributed to her injuries.
Whenever you see a question about apportioning fault in a negligence case, ask: Does the jurisdiction reduce the plaintiff's recovery based on their own carelessness, or does it bar recovery entirely? That distinction is the heart of comparative versus contributory negligence.
Here, the employer admits the driver was negligent but argues the pedestrian's conduct—wearing dark clothing, jaywalking, using her phone—should reduce damages. That argument most directly raises comparative negligence, because it asserts the pedestrian's own carelessness contributed to her injuries, and the doctrine reduces recovery in proportion to fault. The facts clearly show the pedestrian breached her duty of reasonable care, and the employer is not claiming a complete bar but a reduction.
Contributory negligence is wrong because it would completely bar recovery, not merely reduce it—and many jurisdictions have replaced it with comparative negligence. The pedestrian's violation of rules of the road is evidence of negligence, but it doesn't automatically trigger a different doctrine. Express assumption of risk fails because that requires a voluntary, knowing waiver of a specific risk (e.g., signing a waiver)—walking into traffic while distracted is not an express agreement. Last clear chance is also incorrect: that doctrine lets a negligent plaintiff recover if the defendant had the final opportunity to avoid harm. Here, the driver could have avoided the collision if attentive, but that doctrine applies after the defendant is negligent and usually overcomes contributory negligence—not the employer's argument, which seeks to reduce, not rescue, the plaintiff's claim.
Study tip: On the bar, watch for words like "reduce" versus "bar"—they signal comparative vs. contributory negligence. Also, distinguish "express" assumption of risk (contract/waiver) from "implied" (voluntary exposure). Practice spotting which doctrine the defendant is invoking, not just the general theory.
- Under § 31-7, what total amount may P recover from D1 and D2?
Answer: $90,000 from D1 only, because D1's fault exceeds P's but D2's fault does not.
This question tests modified comparative fault with an individual comparison rule: a defendant pays only if that defendant's own fault percentage exceeds the claimant's. So the key is to compare each defendant separately with P, not to combine defendants.
Here, P was 40% at fault, D1 45%, and D2 15%. Since D1's 45% is greater than P's 40%, D1 is liable for its proportional share: 45% of $200,000 = $90,000. D2's 15%, however, is not greater than P's 40%, so D2 is not liable at all. Also, because the statute says no defendant is liable for damages attributable to any other person, liability is several, not joint. Thus P's total recovery is $90,000 from D1 only.
The choice saying "$90,000 from D1 and $30,000 from D2” is wrong because it assumes every defendant automatically pays its assigned percentage; but the statute conditions liability on exceeding the claimant’s fault. The choice offering “$120,000 jointly and severally" is wrong because it incorrectly compares P's fault to the defendants' combined fault (60% > 40%) and then imposes joint liability; the statute requires individual comparison and disallows shifting another defendant's share. The choice saying "nothing" is wrong because P's fault being greater than D2's does not bar recovery from D1; this isn't contributory negligence. The remaining choice, the one limiting recovery to $90,000 from D1, is correct.
Study tip: when a comparative-fault statute says a defendant is liable only if its fault is greater than the claimant's, compare each defendant individually to the claimant — never combine defendants' fault and never assume all at-fault parties pay.
- Does the release bar Sky's claim?
Answer: No, because a release of liability for negligence does not bar liability for reckless conduct.
Express assumption of risk, such as a signed release, can bar negligence claims when it is clear and the jurisdiction enforces it. But releases do not bar liability for reckless, willful, or intentional misconduct. The instructor knew the parachute had failed inspection and been tagged "DO NOT USE," removed the tag, and packed it anyway. That is conscious disregard of a known, serious risk, so the release does not bar Sky's claim. The clear-and-conspicuous answer checks the requirements for releasing negligence and stops, without asking whether the conduct went beyond negligence. The inherent-risk answer misidentifies the risk: a parachute's malfunction may be an inherent risk, but using a parachute known to be defective is a risk created by the defendant. The void-release answer contradicts the stated rule that the jurisdiction enforces such releases for negligence.
- Which legal issue is most significant in determining whether the cyclist can recover any damages?
Answer: Whether the jurisdiction's comparative negligence law is pure or modified.
Whenever you see a jury apportioning fault between a plaintiff and defendant, your first instinct should be to ask how that jurisdiction's comparative negligence system handles the assigned percentages. That is exactly the pivotal issue here. The jury found the cyclist 60% at fault and the driver 40% at fault. If the jurisdiction applies pure comparative negligence, the cyclist can recover damages reduced by her own percentage of fault—meaning she would recover 40% of her medical expenses. However, if the jurisdiction applies modified comparative negligence (which often bars recovery when the plaintiff is 50% or more at fault), her 60% fault completely bars any recovery. Thus, the distinction between pure and modified rules is the most significant legal issue in determining whether she gets any damages.
The other choices are distractors. Whether the driver's speeding was a proximate cause is already established by the jury's 40% fault finding; causation is not the barrier to recovery here. Whether the cyclist's failure to stop was a criminal offense is irrelevant to civil damages—while it could support a negligence per se claim against her, the question is about her recovery, not criminal liability. Finally, whether the driver had the last clear chance is a doctrine used to defeat a contributory negligence bar, but it does not apply to override a comparative fault allocation.
Study tip: On bar exam torts questions, whenever you see specific fault percentages, immediately check the jurisdiction's rule. Look for clues like "pure" or "modified" and the exact threshold (e.g., 50% vs. 51%) to determine if the plaintiff is completely barred or just proportionally reduced.
- How much may Pia recover, and from whom?
Answer: $45,000, from Dex only.
Under the statute, Pia's negligence is compared with that of each defendant separately. Her 40 percent is not greater than Dex's 45 percent, so she may recover from Dex, but it is greater than Eli's 15 percent, so she is barred against Eli. Because joint and several liability is abolished, Dex pays only his own 45 percent share of $100,000, which is $45,000. The $60,000-from-both answer compares Pia's fault with the defendants' combined fault, which the statute does not do. The answer adding $15,000 from Eli overlooks the bar that applies to Eli, whose fault is less than Pia's. The all-from-Dex answer would hold Dex liable for Eli's share as well, which is what joint and several liability would do; that rule has been abolished.
- Under the rule in Copeland, which statement best describes D's liability?
Answer: P's recovery will be reduced, but not barred, if the jury attributes fault to P for knowingly riding despite the prior derailments.
When you see an assumption-of-risk question, first classify the waiver: is it an express agreement with specific risk, or a general warning? Under Copeland, only an explicit waiver acknowledging the specific risk bars recovery. The sign here is a general warning—it doesn't mention loose bolts or derailments—so it cannot be express assumption. That eliminates the second choice.
Next, determine whether implied assumption is primary or secondary. Primary implied applies when the defendant owes no duty because the risk is inherent and not increased by the defendant. But D's maintenance crew failed to tighten a bolt—that is negligence that created the risk. So primary implied does not apply; the derailment wasn't an inherent risk of roller coasters—it was a product of D's carelessness. That eliminates the first choice.
Because D's negligence increased the risk, and P knowingly rode despite knowing about prior derailments from loose bolts, this is secondary implied assumption. Under pure comparative fault, secondary implied is merged into fault allocation—it reduces recovery but does not bar it. Thus, the correct answer is that P's recovery will be reduced, not barred, if the jury attributes fault to him. The last choice is wrong because full recovery is barred? Actually no—full recovery would be allowed only if P had no fault, but here he knowingly encountered the risk, so reduction is appropriate. And the sign's lack of specificity doesn't give full recovery; it just means no express bar.
Study tip: Always separate the duty question (primary) from the comparative-fault question (secondary). Primary is a complete defense; secondary is just a reduction. Also, a warning sign alone never creates express assumption unless it identifies the exact risk.
- What may each party recover?
Answer: Rob $70,000 and Sal $15,000.
Under pure comparative negligence, each claimant recovers its damages reduced by its own percentage of fault, regardless of whether it was more at fault than the other party. Rob's $100,000 is reduced by his 30 percent, so he recovers $70,000. Sal's $50,000 is reduced by her 70 percent, so she recovers $15,000. The nothing-for-Sal answer applies the bar used in modified comparative negligence states, where a party more at fault than the other recovers nothing; pure comparative negligence has no such bar. The $35,000 answer reduces Sal's damages by Rob's 30 percent instead of her own 70 percent. The $30,000 answer multiplies each party's damages by its own percentage of fault instead of reducing the damages by that percentage.
- How much may Ned recover from Ola?
Answer: $35,000, because last clear chance does not survive the adoption of comparative negligence.
Last clear chance developed to soften the harshness of contributory negligence, which barred any plaintiff whose negligence contributed to the injury. Once a state adopts comparative negligence, the reason for the doctrine disappears, and courts apportion damages by fault instead. Ola's later opportunity to avoid the collision is reflected in the jury's allocation of 70 percent of the fault to her. Ned recovers $50,000 reduced by his 30 percent, or $35,000. The last-clear-chance answer applies the doctrine in a system that has replaced it. The no-recovery answer applies contributory negligence, which the state has abandoned. The greater-fault answer confuses comparative negligence with a rule that gives full recovery when the defendant is more at fault; under pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his share however the shares compare.
- Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by Adventure Woods's response?
Answer: Whether Dana's recovery should be reduced or barred because she saw the damaged board and chose to cross the bridge anyway.
When you see a defendant arguing that the plaintiff knowingly encountered a danger, your mind should jump to comparative negligence or assumption of risk—both doctrines that can reduce or bar recovery. Here, Adventure Woods is not denying that the bridge was damaged; it is pointing to Dana's own decision to cross after seeing the rot. That raises the question of whether her conduct should affect her damages.
The correct issue is the one about Dana's recovery being reduced or barred because she saw the damaged board and chose to cross. This is the heart of the defendant's response: it invokes plaintiff's own fault. Under comparative negligence, her recovery would be reduced by her percentage of fault; under assumption of risk, it could be barred entirely (in some jurisdictions). The other choices miss that point.
- "Inherent risk" is wrong because the danger here is not an inherent risk of a high-ropes course (like a natural slip) but a specific, observable defect—the rotted board. Also, the defendant's response is not about the general nature of the activity but about Dana's specific knowledge.
- "Sole cause" misstates causation. Even if Dana saw the board, the board breaking was still a cause of her fall; her decision does not negate the defective condition. The issue is fault, not but-for causation.
- "Adequacy of the safety video" is a red herring. The video warned generally of slips and falls, but the real dispute is what Dana did with her actual observation, not whether the video covered the specific condition.
On exam day, remember: when a defendant emphasizes the plaintiff's knowledge and voluntary choice, you're almost certainly looking at comparative negligence or assumption of risk—not duty, causation, or warning adequacy.
- Under § 23-4, what amount, if any, may P recover from D1 and D2?
Answer: Nothing, because P's 50% negligence is not less than the defendants' combined 50% negligence.
This question tests the threshold bar in a comparative negligence statute. When you see a comparative fault question, first compare the plaintiff's negligence to the combined negligence of all defendants before doing any damages math.
Here, the jury assigned P 50% and D1 and D2 a combined 50%. Under § 23-4(b), the plaintiff may not recover if his percentage "is not less than" the defendants' combined percentage. "Not less than" includes equal to, so P's 50% is exactly at the bar. Therefore P cannot recover anything, regardless of the $100,000 damages or how fault is allocated.
The choice proposing $50,000 because P's negligence is "equal to, not greater than" the defendants' misses the statutory language: equality is disqualifying. The choice proposing $30,000 from D1 and $20,000 from D2 ignores that several liability only applies after the plaintiff clears the subsection (b) threshold. Likewise, the choice proposing $50,000 jointly and severally fails for the same reason and also imports a joint-and-several rule not stated in the statute. The first choice—nothing, because P's 50% is not less than the combined 50%—is the only one that enforces the threshold correctly.
Your study tip: on comparative negligence questions, circle "not less than," "greater than," or "equal to" phrases. A 50/50 split usually bars recovery when the statute says "not less than," but would allow it if it said "greater than."
- What effect does the assumption-of-risk doctrine have on Rae's claim?
Answer: None that bars it: a negligently abandoned pipe is not an inherent risk of skiing, and her recovery is reduced only by her 20 percent fault.
Primary assumption of risk bars recovery only for risks inherent in the sport, those that cannot be eliminated without changing its nature, such as trees, moguls, and changing snow conditions. A pipe that a resort employee negligently left across a marked trail is not inherent in skiing; it is a hazard the resort created. Rae's claim is not barred, and her own carelessness is handled through comparative fault, which reduces her recovery by 20 percent to $80,000. The inherent-risk answer classifies a negligently created hazard as inherent. The experienced-skier answer confuses Rae's own fault with assumption of a risk that bars recovery; her speed is a comparative-fault factor. The abolished answer overstates the change: comparative fault absorbs secondary assumption of risk, but primary assumption of risk for inherent risks survives, and Rae's own fault still reduces her recovery.
- Should Kip's recovery be reduced by 40 percent?
Answer: No, because the statute was meant to protect young workers like Kip against their own carelessness, so his negligence is not a defense.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff's negligence reduces recovery under comparative negligence. But when a statute is designed to protect a class of persons against their own inability to protect themselves, the plaintiff's negligence of the very kind the statute anticipates is not a defense; otherwise the statute's purpose would be defeated. The legislature banned minors from slicers precisely because they tend to injure themselves through carelessness, so Kip's carelessness does not reduce his recovery. The always-reduced answer applies the general rule and ignores this exception. The adult-standard answer imports the rule for children engaged in adult activities, which concerns how a child's conduct is measured, not whether the statute bars the defense; and the statute treats operating the slicer as something Kip should not have been doing at all. The incapable answer misstates the law; a 15-year-old can be negligent, and the reason his negligence does not count is the statute's purpose.
