- Should the court admit the conviction?
Answer: Yes, because the conviction is for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and Rule 609(a)(2) requires admission regardless of the punishment.
Whenever you see a prior conviction offered to impeach a testifying defendant, always start with Rule 609. That rule sorts convictions into two key categories: felonies (punishable by death or more than one year) and crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. For the second category, the rule is automatic—if the crime involves dishonesty or false statement, the court must admit it regardless of whether it is a felony or misdemeanor.
Here, the defendant's conviction for false statements to obtain unemployment benefits squarely falls into that category. False statements are the classic example of dishonesty. Because the conviction is only six years old, it is within Rule 609's ten-year time limit, so there is no bar on age. The court should admit the conviction.
The choice saying "only felonies may be used" is wrong because Rule 609(a)(2) expressly applies to misdemeanors involving dishonesty. The choice claiming "misdemeanor convictions are admissible only if they involve theft" misstates the law—the relevant category is dishonesty or false statement, not theft. The choice saying the defendant "opened the door to all prior bad acts" is wrong because 609 is about convictions, not bad acts, and the door-opening theory is too broad; Rule 404(b) and 608 govern other acts.
Your strategy: on the bar exam, when a prior conviction for fraud, lying, or false statement appears, think "Rule 609(a)(2) automatic admission"—no balancing, no felony requirement. That shortcut will get you the answer quickly.
- Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is most accurate?
Answer: The defense may ask about the underlying false-report conduct on cross-examination if the court finds it probative of truthfulness, but may not introduce extrinsic evidence of it.
Whenever you see a witness-impeachment question involving arrests, dismissed charges, or underlying misconduct, think about the line between Rule 608(b) and Rule 609. Rule 609 governs impeachment by convictions; Rule 608(b) governs specific instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness other than criminal convictions.
Here, Officer Chen has no conviction, so Rule 609 is not the gateway. Instead, the defense may cross-examine him about the underlying false-report conduct — filing a false police report is conduct bearing directly on truthfulness. The court must find that the probative value outweighs prejudice, and the inquiry is limited to cross-examination. Critically, the defense may not introduce extrinsic evidence, such as witnesses or records, to prove the conduct. That is exactly what the correct answer says: the defense may ask about the underlying conduct on cross-examination if the court finds it probative of truthfulness, but may not introduce extrinsic evidence.
The choice saying the defense may ask about the arrest but not the underlying conduct is wrong because an arrest, by itself, is not a specific instance of conduct probative of truthfulness; the underlying conduct is the proper subject. The choice saying neither may be asked because neither resulted in a conviction misreads Rule 608(b), which exists precisely for non-conviction misconduct on cross. The choice saying the defense may introduce evidence of the arrest because arrests are public records and not barred by Rule 608(b) misses that Rule 608(b)'s extrinsic-evidence prohibition prevents using public records as an end-run around cross-examination only.
The takeaway: 608(b allows the question, not the proof; 609 allows conviction evidence, subject to limits. When you see non-conviction misconduct, ask yourself whether the answer offers only cross-examination or improperly tries to bring in outside evidence.
- How should the court rule?
Answer: Overrule the objection, because the question concerns a specific instance of conduct probative of the plaintiff's character for truthfulness and may be asked on cross-examination of the character witness.
When you see a character witness testifying about another person's truthfulness, think FRE 608(b): specific instances of conduct cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence, but on cross-examination the court may allow inquiry into specific instances probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness of the person the witness testified about. Here the defendant's witness attacked the plaintiff's character for truthfulness by saying the plaintiff had a reputation for being untruthful. The plaintiff's attorney then asked the witness whether he knew about the plaintiff's employer discipline for padding time sheets—a specific act of dishonesty. That falls squarely within 608(b)(2): the question concerns a specific instance probative of untruthfulness of the person about whom the witness testified, so the court should overrule.
The first wrong answer assumes specific instances may be asked only about the testifying witness's own character; 608(b)(2) also allows questions about the subject of the character testimony. The second wrong answer says the plaintiff's truthfulness had not been attacked, but the defendant's witness had just testified to the plaintiff's bad reputation for truthfulness, which is an attack. The last wrong answer overstates the rule: extrinsic evidence of prior misconduct is not "always admissible" merely because character evidence was offered; 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence, allowing only cross-examination inquiry.
Remember: cross-examination questions about specific dishonest acts are allowed; bringing in outside witnesses or documents to prove those acts is not.
- Which of the following is admissible to impeach W?
Answer: The defendant may cross-examine W about the false reimbursement requests, but may not introduce the employer's document regardless of whether W admits or denies submitting them; the defendant may also call N to testify about W's reputation for untruthfulness.
This question tests the boundary between permissible cross-examination and extrinsic evidence when impeaching a witness. Under FRE 608(b), specific instances of conduct probative of untruthfulness—like submitting false reimbursement requests—may be explored on cross-examination, but the cross-examiner is stuck with the witness's answer. You may not introduce the employer's document, even if W denies the act or admits it; extrinsic evidence of the underlying conduct is barred. The neighbor's testimony is different: FRE 608(a) allows reputation evidence for untruthfulness to attack credibility, and an attack may begin with that reputation testimony—it does not require some earlier attack on W's character.
The choice saying you may cross-examine but not introduce the document and may call N is therefore correct. The choice limiting cross-examination to acts resulting in a criminal conviction confuses 608(b) with 609, which governs prior convictions; a non-conviction dishonest act can still be asked about. The choice saying the document becomes admissible if W admits it is a trap: a document offered to prove the act is extrinsic evidence, and 608(b) forbids it regardless of W's answer. Finally, the choice allowing the document as a business record and excluding N unless other impeachment evidence exists gets two things wrong: the business-record exception does not override the 608(b) extrinsic-evidence bar, and reputation for untruthfulness is itself a permissible method of attack.
On exam day, when you see impeachment by a prior bad act, ask: Is it cross-examination (allowed) or outside evidence (forbidden)? Reputation and opinion about truthfulness are separate, freestanding routes.
- Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, should the court admit the employer's records?
Answer: No, because evidence of specific instances of conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence, and the witness's denial is conclusive on that point.
This question tests impeachment by specific instances of conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b). When a witness denies a prior act that is offered to show untruthfulness, the cross-examiner generally must accept the answer—extrinsic evidence of that act is not admissible. The employer's records are exactly that: outside evidence offered to prove the witness lied on the stand about filing a fraudulent expense report. Because 608(b) limits such impeachment to cross-examination and bars extrinsic proof, the court should not admit the records. The denial is conclusive for purposes of that collateral inquiry.
The first wrong answer, "extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct probative of truthfulness," misstates the rule: 608(b) allows asking about such acts on cross-examination, but it does not allow proving them with outside witnesses or documents. The second wrong answer, "records contradict the witness's denial and are therefore relevant," ignores that even relevant impeachment evidence must satisfy the Federal Rules; relevance alone cannot override 608(b)'s explicit prohibition. The third wrong answer, "records are hearsay not within any exception," is a tempting alternative, but the records could likely qualify under the business-records exception. The real problem is 608(b), not hearsay.
Study tip: On the bar exam, distinguish 608(b) (specific acts—cross-exam only, no extrinsic evidence) from 609 (prior convictions—extrinsic records are admissible). If you see documents offered to prove a denied bad act, think 608(b) exclusion first.
- Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the former employer's testimony admissible?
Answer: No, because extrinsic evidence may not be used to prove a specific instance of the character witness's conduct to attack his character for truthfulness.
Whenever a witness is impeached with a specific act of dishonesty, the key is to separate what can be asked on cross-examination from what can be proved with outside witnesses. Under FRE 608(b), specific instances of a witness's conduct that are probative of truthfulness—like lying on a resume—may be inquired into on cross-examination, but if the witness denies it, the questioner is stuck with the answer. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted to prove the act. Here, the former employer's testimony would be extrinsic evidence offered solely to show the character witness actually lied. Because 608(b) bars extrinsic proof of a witness's prior specific acts, the testimony is inadmissible even though the cross-examination question itself was proper.
The answer saying the denial opened the door to extrinsic proof is the trap: denial does not unlock admissibility. Likewise, there is no general entitlement to impeach a "hostile" character witness with extrinsic evidence of prior false statements; adversarial witnesses may be cross-examined, but the extrinsic-evidence bar still applies. The answer about collateral matters unrelated to the defendant's character is also wrong because the testimony does concern the witness's own truthfulness—it is barred not because irrelevant, but because extrinsic evidence may not be used to prove a specific instance of the character witness's conduct to attack his character for truthfulness.
Remember the pattern: under 608(b), cross-examination yes; extrinsic evidence no.
- Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the conviction admissible?
Answer: Yes, because the conviction is for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement and is within ten years of the later of conviction or release from confinement.
Whenever you see a prior conviction offered to impeach a witness, immediately think Federal Rule of Evidence 609. That rule has two tracks: crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are generally admissible, while other felonies require a balancing test. But both tracks face the 609(b) time limit: the conviction is admissible only if it is within ten years of the later of the conviction date or the witness's release from confinement for that conviction.
Here, the conviction is 13 years old, but the plaintiff was released from prison 9 years ago. Because release is the later date, only 9 years have passed, so the ten-year window is satisfied. Insurance fraud is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, so the conviction is admissible to impeach her.
The choice saying "no, because more than ten years have elapsed since the conviction" is wrong: it uses only the conviction date, ignoring release. The choice saying prior convictions are inadmissible to impeach a civil plaintiff is wrong: Rule 609 applies to any witness, including a party. The choice saying crimes involving dishonesty are admissible "no matter how much time has passed" is wrong: 609(b) imposes the ten-year limit even on dishonesty crimes.
Study tip: for impeachment by conviction, always compute the ten-year period from the later of conviction or release, and remember that crimes of dishonesty/false statement get automatic admissibility within that window.
- Should the court admit the associate's opinion testimony?
Answer: Yes, because evidence of a witness's truthful character may be admitted once the witness's character for truthfulness has been attacked by evidence of a conviction involving dishonesty.
Whenever you see a character-evidence question involving a witness, focus on two things: whether the evidence is about truthfulness, and whether the witness's credibility has already been attacked. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a), a witness's character for truthfulness may be supported by either reputation or opinion testimony—but only after that character has been attacked. Here, the defendant testified, and the plaintiff impeached her with a prior felony conviction for filing a false tax return. Because that crime involves dishonesty, it directly attacks her credibility. Once attacked, the defendant may "rehabilitate" her credibility by calling the associate to give an opinion that she is truthful. So the court should admit the testimony.
Why are the others wrong? The first choice claims opinion testimony is never allowed and only reputation testimony may be used—that is false; Rule 608(a) expressly permits both. The second choice argues a conviction is not enough to open the door to truthful-character evidence—but a conviction involving dishonesty is a classic attack on truthfulness and does open that door. The fourth choice says a party may always bolster its own witness before cross-examination—that is the real trap. Bolstering is prohibited until the witness's truthfulness has been attacked; it is not automatic or unlimited.
Your study takeaway: when you see truthful-character evidence, ask "Has truthfulness been attacked?" If not, it is inadmissible bolstering. If yes, both opinion and reputation evidence are allowed.
- How should the court rule on the defendant's objection?
Answer: Overrule it, if the court determines that the conduct is probative of the defendant's character for truthfulness and that the inquiry is appropriate under Rule 608(b).
When you see an impeachment question involving a witness's prior bad acts, your first move is to separate two rules: Rule 609 covers criminal convictions, while Rule 608(b) covers specific instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness. Here, the prior lies about sick leave are not convictions, so Rule 608(b) is the framework.
Under Rule 608(b), the court has discretion to allow cross-examination about specific instances of conduct if they are probative of the witness's character for truthfulness — and the inquiry is appropriate. Lying to supervisors is directly dishonest, so it clearly qualifies as probative of truthfulness. The defendant's objection should therefore be overruled if the court finds the conduct probative and the questioning appropriate.
The choice saying the court should sustain because conduct must result in a conviction misstates the law: Rule 608(b) exists precisely for non-conviction conduct. The choice saying the lies are not probative of truthfulness fails because lying is the classic example of dishonest conduct. And the choice allowing extrinsic evidence of the prior lies is the trap: under Rule 608(b), the questioning is limited to cross-examination — you may not introduce outside evidence to prove the prior act.
On exam day, remember this pairing: Rule 608(b) = "ask, but don't prove"; Rule 609 = "conviction, then you can prove." When a bad act lacks a conviction, look to 608(b) and check whether it shows dishonesty.
- Should the court admit the testimony about W's admission?
Answer: No, because after an attack on W's character for truthfulness, the plaintiff may support that character only with reputation or opinion testimony, not with specific instances of truthful conduct.
Whenever a witness's character for truthfulness is attacked, remember the rehabilitation limits: after an attack, the supporting party may offer reputation or opinion testimony that the witness is truthful—but not extrinsic evidence of specific truthful acts. Here, defense counsel's question about lying on a loan application was an attack on W's character for truthfulness because dishonesty on a loan application is probative of untruthfulness. That opened the door for the plaintiff to rehabilitate W with C's opinion that W is truthful. But the coworker's proposed testimony that W once admitted a billing error rather than blaming someone else is a specific instance of conduct offered to prove W's truthful character. Under Rule 608(b), specific instances of conduct may not be proved by extrinsic evidence to support credibility. Thus exclusion was proper.
The answer saying "defense counsel attacked financial history rather than character for truthfulness" is wrong: lying on a loan application is inherently dishonest, so it directly attacks truthfulness. The answer saying "yes, because specific instances of conduct may rehabilitate a witness" is wrong: specific instances may be explored on cross-examination, but they cannot be proved through outside witnesses to support character. And the answer saying "yes, because relevant and not substantially outweighed by prejudice" fails because Rule 403 cannot override the categorical ban in Rule 608(b) on extrinsic evidence of specific instances to support character. For character-for-truthfulness on rehabilitation, use reputation or opinion—not specific acts.
