- Under the statute, is Drake guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because Drake used artifice or trick to induce Vera to admit him,and he intended to steal when he entered.
Whenever you see a burglary question with a statutory definition, the key is to read the statute's special rules about "breaking" carefully — especially when the entry was permitted by the victim. Here, the statute defines breaking to include "any threat, artifice, or trick used to induce an occupant to admit the actor." Drake lied about being a utility worker to get Vera to open the door, and he entered intending to steal jewelry. That fits the definition: he used trickery to gain entry, and he had the required intent to commit a crime inside. So yes, he is guilty.
The choice saying "Vera voluntarily opened the door and consented" misses the point: the consent exception applies only when the actor's purpose in entering is lawful. Drake's purpose was theft, so the consent does not protect him. The choice saying "no physical force against the door" ignores the statute's explicit inclusion of trickery as a form of breaking — physical force is not required. And the choice saying "no breaking is required" is wrong because this statute does require breaking; it simply defines breaking broadly enough to include Drake's deception.
Your study tip: when a statute defines a term, use that definition exactly. Watch for "consent" defenses that depend on the actor's lawful purpose, and remember that trickery can substitute for physical force in burglary.
- Under the rule of Hightower, is Delia guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because Delia entered with intent to steal,and neither impossibility nor abandonment after entry is a defense.
When you see a burglary question, the key is to focus on the defendant's state of mind at the moment of unlawful entry. Burglary does not require that the intended crime actually be possible or completed—only that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a crime inside. Here, the court's rule in Hightower makes that precise point: a mistake about the presence of property is irrelevant, and later abandonment does not undo the completed offense.
Delia is guilty because she pried open the window and climbed in intending to steal cash. That intent existed at the moment of entry, which satisfies the mental state for burglary. The fact that the office was empty is an impossibility—but under Hightower, impossibility is no defense because the theft would have been a crime if the facts had been as she believed. Likewise, her immediate decision to leave does not erase the completed burglary.
The wrong answers each reflect a misconception. "No, because no crime could be committed in the empty office" wrongly treats factual impossibility as a defense. "No, because Delia abandoned the plan before taking any property" wrongly treats abandonment after entry as wiping out the crime. "Yes, because Delia's use of a crowbar to enter the office was burglary regardless of her intent" confuses breaking and entering with burglary—without the intent to commit a crime inside, the crowbar alone would not be enough.
On the bar, remember: for burglary, ask only what the defendant intended at entry. Impossibility and post-entry abandonment are traps—neither defeats the charge.
- Which of the following issues is most significant in determining whether the man committed burglary?
Answer: Whether the detached garage is considered part of the dwelling because of its location and use with the house.
Whenever you see common-law burglary, start with the elements: breaking and entering of the dwelling of another, at night, with intent to commit a felony inside. The fight here is over "dwelling." A home is the core, but detached structures count only when they are within the curtilage—functionally part of the residence by location and use. Because the garage sat 150 feet behind the house, the decisive question is whether it was appurtenant enough to be treated as part of the neighbor's dwelling. That's why "whether the detached garage is considered part of the dwelling because of its location and use with the house" is the controlling issue.
The other choices distract from that gateway. "Whether the neighbor's absence from the garage meant the garage was unoccupied at the time of entry" misfocuses: common-law burglary does not require someone to be physically inside the room entered; it requires the structure to be a dwelling, and temporary absence does not end that status. "Whether power tools kept in a garage are personal property that can be the object of larceny" misses the point: tools can certainly be stolen, and larceny can supply the felony-intent element, but burglary is about the place entered, not just the property taken. "Whether the man formed the intent to steal before or after he pried open the garage door" is an important concurrence issue—intent must exist at the time of breaking/entering—but it does not overcome the threshold defect: if the garage is not part of a dwelling, no intent can turn his conduct into common-law burglary.
On the exam, sort burglary questions by structure first. If the entry was into a house, focus on intent and concurrence; if into an outbuilding, focus on curtilage/location/use. That framework keeps you from jumping too quickly to the tempting but premature intent analysis.
- Which of the following is the man's strongest defense?
Answer: He did not intend to commit larceny until after he had already entered the kitchen.
When you see a common-law burglary question, recite the elements: breaking and entering the dwelling of another at night with the intent to commit a felony therein. The key word is intent at the time of entry, and here the facts deliberately show the man decided to take the cash only after he was inside the kitchen. That is his strongest defense: at the moment he opened the door and stepped in, he intended only to ask for a ride. Forming larceny intent afterward breaks the burglary temporal link.
The wrong choices are traps. Saying the back door was unlocked misreads the breaking element: at common law, any physical force used to gain entry—even pushing open an unlocked door—is enough. The neighbor's absence does not destroy the dwelling status; a dwelling remains a dwelling if it is used as a residence, even when temporarily unoccupied. And the cash being in plain view is irrelevant because larceny does not require the property be hidden or in a container; taking something from an open counter can still satisfy larceny. His earlier statement to a friend that he needed cash is merely motive, not proof of intent at entry.
Study tip: for burglary, always ask when the intent was formed. If intent is formed after entry, it may be larceny or trespass, but not burglary.
- Which of the following issues is most significant in determining whether the woman committed burglary?
Answer: Whether an entry obtained by a false statement can satisfy the breaking requirement when the victim opened the door.
Whenever you see common-law burglary, run the elements: breaking and entering the dwelling of another at nighttime with intent to commit a felony inside. The disputed element here is "breaking." Common-law breaking can be actual, but it can also be constructive—and gaining entry by fraud is a classic example. The woman lied about being an emergency medical technician responding to a gas leak, so the neighbor's invitation was not genuine consent. A consent obtained by deception does not cure the trespassory quality of the entry, meaning her crossing the threshold can satisfy the breaking requirement. That is why the issue of an entry obtained by a false statement is the most significant.
The answer about becoming a trespasser only when she took the watch is flawed because burglary requires intent at the moment of entry. She formed that intent before knocking, and because her entry was obtained by fraud, she was already a trespasser upon entering—not merely when she grabbed the watch.
The hall-table issue misses the point. Even if visitors normally had access to the hall, the homeowner's consent was invalid because it was induced by fraud, so the area's ordinary accessibility does not cure the unlawful entry.
The nighttime issue at 11:00 p.m. is not the central problem; on a dark night, 11:00 p.m. likely satisfies the common-law nighttime requirement, but the contested issue is the validity of the consent.
Study tip: whenever permission is involved in a burglary question, ask whether the consent was genuine. If it was obtained by fraud or threat, expect constructive breaking.
- Which issue is most significant in evaluating whether Alicia committed common-law burglary?
Answer: Whether Alicia's permission to use the house extended to the locked upstairs study.
Whenever you see common-law burglary, anchor yourself in its elements: breaking and entering the dwelling of another at night with intent to commit a felony inside. Consent is central—if the entrant had permission to be in the place, there is no unlawful entry. Here, Alicia's house-sitting permission was limited: she could use the kitchen and living room, but the upstairs study was expressly off-limits and locked. That makes the scope of her permission the decisive issue. If her license to enter the house included the study, her entry would not be burglarious even if she intended theft; if it did not, then unlocking the door was a breaking and an unlawful entry.
The wrong choices miss this. "Lawful occupant of the entire house" overstates a house-sitter's status: she was a licensee with limited access, not an occupant with full authority. "iPad in plain view or concealed" confuses burglary with larceny—burglary turns on unauthorized entry and intent, not visibility of the stolen item. "Admitted planning to take the iPad before she went upstairs" establishes intent, a necessary element, but it is not the pivotal issue because even a thief with intent commits burglary only if the entry is unauthorized.
Study tip: on burglary questions, first test whether the defendant had permission to enter the specific place, then ask about intent.
- Which of the following, if true, would provide the man his strongest defense to the burglary charge?
Answer: The man honestly believed that the cash he intended to take from the kitchen drawer was his own money.
Common-law burglary is a specific-intent crime: the prosecution must prove a breaking and entering of another's dwelling at night with the intent to commit a felony inside. Here, the night hour and entry are likely satisfied, so the real battle is over the man's state of mind at the moment of entry—
The strongest defense is that he honestly believed the cash in the kitchen drawer was his own money. If true, he lacked the intent to commit larceny inside, because larceny requires taking property of another. He may have intended to take cash, but not to steal; and burglary cannot occur without that underlying felonious intent. This mistake-of-fact claim directly negates the mens rea element.
The other choices do not rescue him. The fact that the back door was unlocked does not matter: at common law, opening a closed door—even an unlocked one—is a sufficient "breaking," because the defendant moved an obstruction to entry. Finding no cash and leaving empty-handed also fails: burglary is complete upon entry with the required intent, regardless of whether the theft succeeded. Finally, alcohol-impaired judgment is not a winner because, although voluntary intoxication can sometimes negate specific intent, the facts here say he remained aware that he was entering to steal cash; so his intent was formed despite the alcohol.
When you see burglary, anchor on the moment of entry: Did the defendant form the specific intent to commit a felony inside? Physical details like unlocked doors or whether anything was taken are secondary; honest mistake can be powerful because it eliminates exactly that intent.
- Under the rule of Calloway, is Pat guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because Pat remained in the building after his permission expired and intended to steal at that time.
Whenever you see a burglary question with a passage quoting a state rule, identify the exact moment the defendant's right to be on the premises ended. The Calloway rule is a deliberate expansion of common-law burglary: remaining after permission expires can satisfy the entry element, and intent is assessed at that expiration moment, not at the threshold.
Here, Pat entered lawfully to deliver a package, but he stayed in the lobby after the building closed. The key fact is that he decided to steal the laptop shortly before closing and then remained without permission. At the moment his permission expired—when the building closed—he intended to commit a crime inside. Under Calloway, that is enough. So Pat is guilty.
Why are the "no" choices wrong? "Initial entry was lawful" is true but irrelevant, because Calloway says remaining can be the offense. "Intent formed only after initial entry" misses the rule: intent may be formed later and is measured when the right to remain ends. And "did not use force or break into a locked area" imports common-law breaking language that this rule does not require; Pat's unauthorized remaining supplies the required conduct.
On test day, apply the rule in the passage literally. Do not default to common-law elements. If a question describes permission expiring while the defendant is inside with criminal intent, that is likely a burglary conviction under a Calloway-style rule.
- Under Section 12-20, is D guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because D knowingly remained in the library after his license to be there was revoked, and he remained with the intent to steal.
When you see a burglary statute that criminalizes both entering and remaining unlawfully, the key is spotting when an initially lawful presence flips into an unlawful one. Here, Section 12-20(c) explicitly says that a license to be in a public building can be revoked, and once D knows he has been told to leave the whole building, continued presence is unlawful. That makes this burglary straightforward: D's initial entry welcome or not, once the guard bans him, he is remaining unlawfully; and while remaining illegally, he harbors intent to steal a laptop. The statute's intent element is satisfied at the moment of unlawful remaining plus intent to commit a crime therein—he does not need to complete the theft.
The argument that "burglary requires an unlawful entry at the outset" misconceives the offense: subsection (a) expressly covers "enters or remains," and subsection (d) says initial lawful entry is no defense. The "no force" argument misses that force is irrelevant; burglary here requires only unlawful presence inside a building with criminal intent, not breaking or security bypass. And the "laptop not yet taken" argument confuses burglary with theft; burglary is complete once unlawful remaining coincides with intent to steal, even if the theft occurs later or not at all.
On exam day, remember: read "enters or remains" carefully—if a statute includes "remains," an originally lawful visitor can become a burglar when his permission is revoked and he stays with felonious intent.
- Which issue is most important in determining whether Rafi committed common-law burglary?
Answer: Whether Rafi intended to take the cash when he first entered the neighbor's house.
Common-law burglary is the breaking and entering of the dwelling of another at nighttime with the intent to commit a felony inside. A question like this is testing whether you remember the mental-state timing requirement: the defendant must intend the felony at the moment of entry, not merely after entering.
Here, Rafi entered to ask for a jump-start and only took the cash after noticing it inside. If he formed the intent to steal after he was already in the mudroom, he did not commit burglary. That is why the key issue is whether Rafi intended to take the cash when he first entered the neighbor's house.
The other choices miss the element of concurrence. Whether Rafi used more force than necessary is irrelevant because common-law breaking requires only a minimal physical opening of a closed door, not excessive force. Whether he would have returned the cash if the neighbor appeared is likewise irrelevant; later remorse does not erase larcenous intent, and it still does not prove intent at entry. Whether Rafi's car was actually disabled does not matter, because even a genuine need for a jump-start would not justify a burglary, and a false excuse would only matter if it showed he planned to steal before entering.
On bar questions, check the defendant's mental state at the time of the entry. If the intent forms after entry, the crime may be larceny or trespass, but not burglary.
- Can D be convicted of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because D entered a separately secured, nonpublic portion of the hospital with intent to steal, and the open-to-public exception does not reach that portion.
Whenever you see an "open to the public" exception in a burglary statute, think portion-specific, not building-wide. The statute here criminalizes entering "a building, or any separately secured or occupied portion" with intent to commit a crime, and the open-to-public exception protects only someone who "enters only a portion" open to the public, unless that portion is separately secured or the person lacks license or privilege to enter it.
D did enter the hospital's public lobby during visiting hours with a visitor badge, so that lobby entry was authorized and open. But burglary was completed later: he followed a nurse through a keypad-secured "Staff Only" door into a supply closet. That closet is a separately secured, nonpublic portion of the building. D lacked license or privilege to be there, and he entered it with intent to steal oxycodone. The open-to-public exception does not reach that secured portion, so yes, D can be convicted.
The first wrong answer treats the exception as covering the entire hospital because the hospital was open to the public; that ignores the statute's portion-by-portion analysis. A hospital can be public in its lobby but restricted in its supply closet. The second wrong answer claims D did not force the keypad-secured door, but burglary does not require force or breaking; "unlawful entry" for statutory purposes means entering without license or privilege. Following an employee through a secured door does not grant D permission to be in the closet. The third wrong answer correctly says yes but for the wrong reason: D's preexisting intent did not make his authorized public-lobby entry an unlawful entry. The relevant unlawful entry occurred when he crossed into the secured supply closet with intent to steal. The initial intent matters, but the moment of entry that matters is the entry into the separately secured portion.
Study tip: watch for the exact "portion" language. If the statute separately protects secured parts of a building, the state can convict based on the defendant's entry into that restricted area — the open-public lobby does not give him a free pass to every locked door behind it.
- Under the statute, is Alex guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because Alex used force, however slight, to open a closed doorand entered a dwelling with intent to steal.
Burglary questions often turn on statutory definitions. Here the statute defines "breaking" as any force, however slight, used to create or enlarge an opening to gain entry, and it expressly says damage or a locked door is not required. Alex found a closed door, turned the knob, and pushed it open. That used force to create an opening for entry, and he did so with intent to steal cash. So all elements of burglary are satisfied.
The answer saying "no, because the door was unlocked and undamaged" misunderstands the definition: force can be slight and need not damage anything or defeat a lock. The answer saying "no, because Alex entered through an existing doorway rather than an opening he made" also misses that pushing a closed door creates the opening needed for entry; the statute does not require breaking part of the structure itself. The answer saying "yes, because nighttime entry alone is sufficient" is flawed because nighttime is not an element under this statute, and burglary still requires breaking and entry plus intent—though those facts exist here, nighttime alone would not be enough.
Strategy: when a statute defines a term, apply that definition literally and resist common-law instincts like requiring damage or a locked door. If the facts show a closed door plus applied force, that is a breaking.
- Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by these facts?
Answer: Whether Carmen's arm crossing the window frame constitutes an entry for purposes of burglary.
Whenever you see burglary facts, immediately checklist the elements: breaking and entering, usually of a dwelling, with intent to commit a crime inside. The contested element here is "entry." Carmen clearly broke the window and took the tablet, but the neighbor could not tell whether Carmen's hand crossed the window frame. That factual uncertainty matters because, for burglary, entry occurs when any part of the body—or an instrument used to commit the offense—crosses into the structure. Stepping inside is not required; an arm reaching through the window can be enough. Thus, whether Carmen's arm crossed the frame is the most significant legal issue.
The wrong choices reflect common traps. "Whether the tablet was taken from a place within the curtilage of the home" confuses burglary with Fourth Amendment search law; curtilage concerns property protections, not the elements of burglary. "Whether Carmen's possession of the tablet was sufficient to prove she intended to steal it" misdirects you—possession plus her own admission of grabbing it supports intent, and the real question is entry, not intent. Finally, "Whether the neighbor's inability to see the tablet being taken makes the identification unreliable" is a red herring about witness accuracy; the neighbor identified Carmen breaking the window, and the tablet was found in her pocket.
Study tip: in burglary questions, never assume "entering" means the whole body. Any crossing of the threshold—a hand, a foot, even a tool inserted to commit the crime—can satisfy entry. Focus on the plane of the opening.
- Which issue is most likely to determine whether Tomas committed common-law burglary?
Answer: Whether the cabin was used for overnight habitation even though the couple was not living there that winter.
Whenever you see a common-law burglary question, start with the elements: breaking and entering the dwelling of another at nighttime with intent to commit a felony inside. The contested element here is whether the cabin qualifies as a "dwelling" while the couple is away for the winter.
That is why the key issue is whether the cabin was used for overnight habitation even though the couple was not living there that winter. Common-law burglary protects structures regularly used for overnight lodging, not just any building with a roof. A summer home can remain a dwelling even if temporarily unoccupied, because the "dwelling" status turns on its customary use for sleeping, not on whether someone is physically inside at the moment.
The other choices miss the central question. Whether the TV and microwave were fixtures or personal property matters to larceny, but burglary requires only an intent to commit a felony, and removing either could support that intent. Whether Tomas knew the couple used the cabin as their summer home is not the real issue: the cabin's actual character as a dwelling is what matters, and he already knew they spent summers there. Whether Tomas intended to take the appliances before entering may help prove intent to commit a felony at entry, but the intent element is already satisfied by his pre-planned theft—so it does not determine the dwelling issue.
Study tip: when a burglary question features an oddly specific fact about occupancy, immediately think "dwelling" and ask: was this place used for overnight habitation?
- Under the statute, is Dan guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because the screwdriver tip intruded into the building and Dan intended to steal when he inserted it.
Whenever you see a statutory definition in a criminal law question, read it literally — the statute is the whole game. Here, the statute defines "enter" as intrusion of any body part or any physical object, however slight, expressly including an intrusion made solely to gain entry. Dan inserted the screwdriver tip across the threshold into the store's interior, and he did so intending to steal cash. That satisfies both the act and the mental state.
The correct answer — "Yes, because the screwdriver tip intruded and Dan intended to steal" — follows directly from the statutory text. No part of Dan's body needed to cross; the object was enough. The wrong answer claiming "no bodily entry" misreads the statute's "any physical object" language. The claim that the screwdriver was used "only to gain entry" is actually a trap: the statute explicitly covers intrusions made solely to gain entry, so that fact supports guilt rather than defeating it. Finally, the answer about abandoning before opening the door misses that burglary requires only entry with intent to commit a crime; Dan never had to complete the larceny or take anything. Once the screwdriver crossed into the building with his intent to steal, the crime was complete.
Remember: on bar exam questions, when a statute defines a term, your job is to apply that definition mechanically — do not import common-law definitions or "common sense" about what entering a building means.
- Is D guilty of burglary?
Answer: No, because D did not intend to commit a felony, larceny, or assault at the time of entry; he formed the intent to steal only after he was inside.
Whenever you see a burglary question, the key is the concurrence requirement: the intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault must exist at the moment of the breaking and entering. Here, D's false statement about a water leak does make the entry a constructive breaking—V's daughter's consent was fraudulently obtained, so the law treats it as no consent at all. But that only satisfies the act element. The problem is the intent element. The passage explicitly tells you D had no intent to steal when he entered; he formed it only after seeing the cash inside. Under the rule from Pelham, an intent formed after entry is insufficient, and the later theft does not by itself prove earlier intent. So D is not guilty.
The answer claiming the later taking establishes intent at entry reverses the required sequencing—that's the temporal-concurrence trap. Similarly, the answer saying the jury may infer intent from the false statement and immediate taking invites speculation, but the passage supplies a direct fact ("no intent to steal when he enters") that controls over inference. The answer about D not personally opening the door misunderstands constructive breaking: fraud or threat makes the occupant's act of opening the door a breaking attributable to D. The correct result is that D lacked the required intent at the moment of entry, despite the constructive breaking.
Study tip: separate the act and intent elements. A valid breaking with a later-formed intent is attempted breaking, not burglary—so always check when the intent arose.
- Under the statute, is Rob guilty of burglary?
Answer: Yes, because Vic had a possessory interest in the bedroom, Rob was not licensed or privileged to enter it,and Rob intended to steal.
Whenever you see a burglary question, parse the statutory language instead of relying on common-law images. Here the key elements are entry, a dwelling of another, and intent to commit a crime at the time of entry.
Rob is guilty because he knowingly entered a portion of the apartment that belonged to Vic. Under the statute, a "dwelling" includes any portion of a structure used for overnight lodging, and Vic's locked bedroom qualifies. Vic's weekend absence does not matter because the statute says temporary absence does not make a dwelling cease to be one. Rob entered with intent to steal Vic's laptop, and nothing suggests Vic licensed or privileged him to enter that locked room.
The answer that Rob had a possessory interest in the apartment and therefore cannot burglarize it misreads the statute: the statute expressly says an actor may be guilty even if he also has a possessory interest in the same structure, and the question is whether another person has a possessory interest in the portion entered. The "Vic was away" answer confuses current use with the structure's purpose. The "no force" answer imports common-law breaking, but this statute requires only knowingly entering or remaining—not force. When a statute defines burglary, apply its exact words and remember that "portion" and "temporary absence" are deliberate expansions of liability.
