- Which issue is most important in evaluating Derek's argument?
Answer: Whether Derek left because he feared being caught rather than because of a genuine change of heart.
Whenever you see an abandonment defense to attempt, the central question is always the same: was the abandonment voluntary, or was it forced by circumstances? The law excuses a defendant who genuinely renounces criminal intent, but not one who merely postpones or flees because the risk of getting caught just went up.
Here, Derek argues he should be acquitted because he abandoned the robbery. The most important issue is whether he left because he feared being caught rather than because of a genuine change of heart. That distinction is the heart of abandonment doctrine. If he ran because the police arrived, his abandonment was not voluntary — it was a response to external pressure — and he remains guilty of attempted robbery.
The wrong answers miss this focus. Whether the clerk understood the note as a threat of immediate force or only as a request for money goes to the elements of robbery, not to Derek's reason for stopping. Whether Derek actually possessed a firearm or merely pretended is irrelevant because robbery can be accomplished by intimidation without a real weapon. And whether the police car arrived before the demand or only after he left matters only insofar as it reveals why Derek abandoned — it does not independently defeat the charge; in fact, if the police arrived after the demand, his attempt was already complete.
Study tip: on the bar exam, "abandonment" questions are really questions about voluntariness. Ask yourself, "Why did the defendant stop?" If the reason is fear of detection or other external pressure, the defense fails.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Owen can be convicted of attempted kidnapping?
Answer: Whether Owen's purchase of supplies and driving past the house were merely preparation or had already become an attempt.
Whenever you see an attempted-crime question, the core issue is twofold: the defendant's intent to commit the target crime and whether his conduct crossed the line from preparation to an actual attempt. Here, Owen's intent is not seriously in doubt—he admitted planning to kidnap the boss—so the decisive question is whether his acts were enough.
That is why the most significant issue is whether Owen's purchase of supplies and driving past the house were merely preparation or had already become an attempt. At common law, preparation alone is not an attempt; the defendant must take a substantial step toward completing the crime. Buying rope, duct tape, and a ski mask, and driving past the house twice, may show planning, but they may still be too far from actually seizing the boss. This is precisely the legal battle the prosecution must win.
The other choices are traps. Whether Owen's statement to the coworker was a genuine threat is not an element of attempted kidnapping; even a serious threat only helps prove intent, which is already established. Whether Owen intended to use the rope and duct tape if he had actually gone to the house confuses the issue—the relevant intent is his intent to commit kidnapping, and he admitted that; the problem is the sufficiency of his acts. Whether the boss was at home is irrelevant, because Owen never even reached the house, and attempt liability does not require the victim's presence.
Study tip: when an attempt question appears, always separate intent from conduct, then ask whether the defendant's actions were a substantial step or just preparation.
- D decided to kill his estranged wife V. He bought a loaded handgun, drove to her apartment building, entered her unlocked apartment, and stood at the foot of her bed while she slept. He pointed the gun at her head and began to squeeze thee trigger. At that instant, his phone buzzed with a text from his mother: 'I know you are in her apartment. Come home now.' D, immediately fearing his mother would call police, lowered the gun and left without injuring V. Charged with attempted murder, D raises thee abandonment defense. Is the defense available?
Answer: No, because D's abandonment was motivated by fear that his mother would report him to police, a circumstance increasingther probability of apprehension.
When you see an attempt question with an abandonment defense, your first move should be to separate voluntary changes of heart from involuntary ones driven by detection risk or delay. The statute makes that distinction decisive: abandonment is a defense only if the actor abandons his criminal purpose for reasons that do not include increased likelihood of being caught or postponing the crime.
D certainly took a substantial step: he armed himself, entered V's apartment, aimed the loaded gun at her head, and began squeezing the trigger. The defense fails, however, because his stated motive was not conscience but fear: he immediately feared his mother would call police. That is "a circumstance increasing probability of apprehension," exactly what the statute disqualifies. Even if he also had remorse, the defense is unavailable if the abandonment was motivated "in whole or in part" by that fear. So the correct choice is: "No, because D's abandonment was motivated by fear that his mother would report him to police, a circumstance increasingther probability of apprehension."
The choice saying "D voluntarily chose to stop... his change of heart... prevented the killing" misreads the facts: antifear of detection is not voluntary under the statute, however sincere his immediate compliance. The choice saying "he had not yet performedthe last act necessary... withdrawal camein time" confuses attempt with completion; an attempt is complete once a substantial step is taken, and abandonment thereafter can help only if voluntary. Finally, the choice saying "once he pointed... began squeezing... he had already completedthe attempt, and a subsequent change of heart cannot undo liability" gets the timing wrong in a different way: a post-completion change of heart can be a defense when truly voluntary; here liability sticks only because his motive was fear of detection, not because the attempt was already complete.
Remember: on attempt questions, ask why the defendant stopped. If the answer is "police, mother, escape, or waiting for a better time," no abandonment defense. If the answer is "remorse, conscience, or realization whit was wrong," the defense may work.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Priya can be convicted of attempted murder?
Answer: Whether Priya intended to kill Dan or only acted with conscious disregard for his life.
Whenever you see an attempted murder question, anchor on one rule: attempt is a specific-intent crime. For attempted murder, the prosecution must prove the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being, not merely acted recklessly or with conscious disregard.
Here, Priya said, "I didn't care if he was there; I just wanted him to stop." That statement is the key. If she intended to kill Dan, she can be guilty of attempted murder even if he was absent. If she only fired with conscious disregard for his life, she might be guilty of something like reckless endangerment, but not attempted murder, because attempt requires purpose to cause death.
The choice about whether the shots created a substantial risk of death mistakes murder liability for attempted murder. A risk-creating act could support depraved-heart murder if someone died, but attempted murder still demands intent to kill. Likewise, whether Dan was in the apartment is not controlling—attempted murder can occur when the intended victim is not there, so long as the defendant intended to kill and took a substantial step. The choice about whether the rifle was loaded with live ammunition tests an act requirement, but the decisive fight here is mental state, not weapon condition.
Study tip: when you see attempted murder, immediately ask, "Did the defendant intend to kill?" If the facts only show recklessness, the correct answer is almost always "not attempted murder."
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Alex can be convicted of attempted murder?
Answer: Whether Alex's request, payment, and provision of information went beyond solicitation and became a substantial step toward the killing.
Whenever you see attempted murder with an undercover "victim," focus on two things: the defendant's intent and whether his conduct went beyond preparation. Attempt requires the specific intent to commit the crime plus an act that is a substantial step toward completing it.
Here, Alex clearly intended to kill Sam — he wanted Sam dead, solicited the killing, and acted on that intent. The harder question is whether his conduct crossed the line from preparation to attempt. That is why the most significant issue is whether Alex's request, payment, and provision of information went beyond solicitation and became a substantial step toward the killing. Solicitation alone is not attempt, but when the defendant funds the hitman and supplies the address and photo, a jury may find a substantial step — moving from planning to execution.
The wrong choices miss this distinction. Whether Sam was placed in actual danger is irrelevant because factual impossibility is no defense: Alex believed the listener was a hitman, so his mistake about the undercover officer does not defeat attempt. Whether the undercover officer actually agreed is also not controlling — attempt can occur without the other party's agreement, provided Alex takes a substantial step. Finally, Alex's financial interest in Sam's death may show motive, but motive alone never proves attempt; it supports intent, not the act required.
Study tip: On attempt questions, ask "What did the defendant actually do beyond asking or planning?" If the conduct is merely preparatory, it is not attempt; if it is a substantial step, factual impossibility will not save the defendant.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Gilbert can be convicted of attempted murder?
Answer: Whether voluntary intoxication can negate the specific intent required for attempted murder.
This question tests attempted murder and the defense of voluntary intoxication. Whenever you see a charge for attempt, remember that attempt is a specific-intent crime: the prosecution must prove not only the act (a substantial step) but also the intent to commit the underlying offense—here, intent to kill. So the central issue is whether voluntary intoxication can negate that required specific intent.
That is exactly why the correct answer is the choice about voluntary intoxication negating the specific intent required for attempted murder. Voluntary intoxication is generally not a defense to general-intent crimes, but it can negate the specific intent needed for crimes like attempted murder. If Gilbert was so intoxicated that he could not form the intent to kill, he may be acquitted despite firing the shotgun.
The wrong choices miss the core legal question. Whether the neighbor was in the room addresses factual impossibility, but attempted murder can still occur even if the intended victim is not actually there, as long as Gilbert intended to kill and took a substantial step. Whether the shotgun was loaded with live ammunition is similarly about capability or danger, not intent; an attempt can exist even with an unloaded gun if the defendant believed it was loaded. Whether Gilbert had previously argued with the neighbor could show motive, but motive alone is not an element and does not resolve whether his intoxication negated intent.
Study tip: on the bar exam, see "voluntary intoxication" and immediately ask whether the crime is specific intent. If yes, intoxication may be a complete defense by negating intent.
- D agreed to serve as getaway driver for an armed robbery of a jewelry store planned by E. D knew that E always carried a loaded gun, but E assured D he would use it only to threaten, not to shoot anyone. During the robbery, a security guard reached for his gun;E fired directly at the guard's chest,intending to kill him,but missed. D,waiting outside in the car,heard the shot but did not see it. D is charged as an accomplice to attempted murder of the guard. Under Ellison,is D guilty?
Answer: No, because D did not personally intendthatthe guard be killed,and his mere knowledge that E might use lethal force is insufficient for accomplice liability for attempted murder.
Whenever you see accomplice liability for a specific-intent crime like attempted murder, the central question is not just what the defendant helped do, but what the defendant personally intended. Ellison makes that clear: attempted murder requires an intent that the victim be killed, and an accomplice cannot be convicted unless that intent is proven.
Here, D knew E was armed and agreed to drive for the armed robbery, but D hoped no one would be hurt. E's shot at the guard may have been in furtherance of the robbery, but D did not personally intend the guard's death. Mere knowledge that E might use lethal force—or even that E was likely to—does not supply the specific intent required. So D is not guilty of attempted murder as an accomplice, though he may be guilty of attempted robbery.
The first wrong choice—that D is guilty as a natural and probable consequence of the robbery—is exactly the theory Ellison rejects: that rule cannot satisfy the specific intent needed for attempted murder. The second wrong choice—that D intended the robbery's success and E's attempt furthered that purpose—makes the same error by substituting a general criminal purpose for the required intent to kill. The last wrong choice—that D did not aid or abet because he was outside and did not see the shot—misses the point: D did aid the robbery by driving, and visibility is irrelevant; the failure is on intent, not assistance.
Remember: for attempted murder, imputed intent is not enough—the accomplice must personally want the victim dead.
- D, angry about being fired, went to his former employer's parking lot at shift change, drew a handgun,and fired five shots toward a group of employees standing near the entrance. He aimed at the pavement about ten feet in front of them, yelling, 'Get out of here or I'll shoot!' One bullet ricocheted off the pavementand narrowly missed a worker's leg. D later admitted he wanted only to frighten the employees, not to harm them. Charged with attempted murder. Under Okafor,is D guilty?
Answer: No, because D lacked the specific intent to kill;he intended only to scare them,and neither recklessness nor intent to cause serious harm suffices for attempted murder.
Whenever you see attempted murder, the central question is always the defendant's specific intent: did he intend to kill a human being? Under Okafor, extreme recklessness and intent to cause serious bodily harm are not enough—only a specific intent to kill satisfies the crime.
Here, D admitted he wanted only to frighten the employees, not harm them. Because he lacked the specific intent to kill, he is not guilty of attempted murder. The fact that his conduct created a grave risk of death does not substitute for intent. This is why the correct answer is the choice saying D lacked the specific intent to kill, because he intended only to scare them, and neither recklessness nor intent to cause serious harm suffices.
The other choices miss that core point. The claim that firing into a crowded lot created a very high risk of death, so extreme recklessness suffices, directly contradicts *Okafor*—it is a tempting but forbidden substitute for intent. The "intent to frighten transferred" theory is also flawed: transferred intent does not create an intent to kill where none existed; it only moves a completed intent from one intended victim to an unintended one. Finally, the suggestion that D is not guilty because he did not select and aim at a particular victim overstates the law—attempted murder can occur without a preselected victim if the defendant intends to kill someone; here the real problem is his admitted lack of any intent to kill.
Study tip: on intent crimes, focus on the defendant's stated or inferred purpose, not the risk created. Words like "only wanted to scare" are red flags for no specific intent to kill.
- Dan wanted his business partner Victor dead. A friend introduced Dan to Frank, whom Dan believed to be a professional hitman. Frank was in fact an undercover police officer. Dan paid Frank $10,000, gave him Victor's photograph and home address,and told Frank to 'make it look like an accident.' Frank immediately arrested Dan. Dan is charged with attempted murder. Is Dan guilty under the statute?
Answer: No, because Dan's solicitation of Frank—an undercover officer,neither innocent nor irresponsible—does not by itself constitute attempt under the statute.
This question tests the line between solicitation and attempted crime under a specific statute. The controlling clue is Section 115.01(2): soliciting another person to commit a crime—whether by payment or other inducement—does not by itself constitute attempt. Dan paid Frank, gave him Victor's photograph and address, and told him to make it look like an accident. Those are classic solicitation by payment and instruction. Frank, an undercover officer, is neither an innocent nor an irresponsible person whose conduct Dan could cause or aid under subsection (1)(b). So Dan's actions do not satisfy the attempt statute.
The choice that says Dan is guilty because his payment and instructions were a substantial step beyond mere solicitation imports the common-law substantial-step test, but the statute expressly excludes solicitation by itself. The choice that says Dan is guilty because he believed Frank would kill Victor and factual impossibility is no defense ignores the same statutory exclusion: factual impossibility is not a defense generally, but it does not transform solicitation into attempt here. The choice that says Dan is not guilty because Frank was an undercover officer making completion legally impossible is also flawed: the intended killing is legally prohibited, so Frank's role made completion factually impossible, not legally impossible.
Study tip: if the statute separately defines attempt and says solicitation alone is not enough, apply that language literally. Don't substitute common-law substantial-step analysis.
- Deeply in debt, D decided to rob the First Federal Bank. Over three mornings, he drove to the bank, parked across the street, and watched the tellers' routines, the security guard's patrol schedule, and the arrival time of the armored car. On the fourth morning, D drove to the bank carrying a loaded handgun and a ski mask; when he saw a police car parked in front of the bank, he immediately drove away. He was arrested a short time later. Is D guilty of attempted bank robbery under Section 5.01?
Answer: Yes, because his repeated surveillance of the bank's security procedures was reconnoiteringthe place, a statutorily enumerated substantial step strongly corroborative of his intent to rob it.
Whenever you see an attempt question, focus on two things: the defendant's culpable mental state and whether he took a "substantial step" strongly corroborating his criminal purpose. Mere preparation is not enough, but the statute here explicitly lists "reconnoitering the place" as a substantial step if it strongly corroborates intent.
D's three mornings of watching tellers' routines, the guard's patrol, and the armored-car arrival were textbook reconnoitering of the bank—exactly the kind of conduct the statute names. This made the attempt complete before the fourth morning. Arriving later with a gun and ski mask only reinforced that purpose.
The "mere preparation" and "abandonment" arguments fail because the surveillance was already a substantial step; a later change of heart cannot erase an attempt that has already occurred. The "purchase and driving" answer also misses the mark: the statute says obtaining or transporting the means to commit the crime does not, by itself, constitute a substantial step. Here the strong corroboration came from the surveillance, not from carrying the gun.
Make sure you distinguish preparation from an enumerated substantial step. When a statute specifically defines conduct like reconnoitering as sufficient, repeated targeted observation will usually satisfy the attempt requirement—even if the defendant never enters the scene or backs out afterward.
- Which issue is most significant in determining whether Ray can be convicted of attempted possession of heroin?
Answer: Whether Ray can be convicted even though the substance he received was not actually heroin.
This question tests the law of attempt, specifically whether "impossibility" can defeat a charge. In attempt cases, the central distinction is between factual impossibility and legal impossibility. Factual impossibility occurs when the defendant believed the circumstances were criminal, but they were not—for example, buying what he thinks is heroin that is actually baking soda. Legal impossibility occurs when the defendant's intended conduct is not a crime even under the facts as he believed them. Factual impossibility is generally not a defense to attempt.
Ray's receipt of baking soda is the crux of the case. He intended to possess heroin, believed the powder was heroin, and took a substantial step by paying for and accepting it. The fact that the substance was not actually heroin does not erase that intent; he attempted to possess heroin. Therefore, the most significant issue is whether he can be convicted despite the substance being fake.
The wrong answers are traps around other issues. His intent to use rather than distribute is irrelevant because attempted possession does not require intent to distribute. His status as a purchaser instead of a seller is also irrelevant; buyers can commit possession offenses. Finally, entrapment is not established merely because an undercover officer offered to sell him drugs—entrapment requires government inducement plus a lack of predisposition, neither of which appears here.
Study tip: Whenever a fact pattern involves fake contraband, ask whether the defendant's mistake was factual or legal. Factual impossibility is no defense; legal impossibility is. That distinction is a frequent bar-exam issue.
