- Is Prime entitled to indemnity from SteelFab for the $300,000?
Answer: No, because the statute voids indemnity for Prime's own negligence, and Prime paid only its own 30% share.
This question tests the interplay between contractual indemnity clauses and anti-indemnity statutes. The key move is to isolate the indemnitee's own fault percentage. The statute here voids any provision requiring a party to indemnify another for injury caused by the indemnitee's own negligence. The jury found Prime 30% at fault, and Prime paid exactly its 30% share—$300,000. That payment represents Prime's own negligence. The contract's "even if caused in part by Prime's negligence" language conflicts with the statute, which voids indemnity to the extent of Prime's own negligence. The "sole negligence" exception does not save it, because the statute voids indemnity for any of Prime's negligence, not just sole negligence. So Prime cannot recover.
The first wrong answer—that SteelFab's 70% fault makes it "primarily responsible"—misapplies comparative fault; the statute overrides that. The second wrong answer, relying on the "sole negligence" exclusion, is a trap: that exclusion addresses 100% Prime fault, but the statute goes further, voiding the clause for partial negligence too. The third wrong answer, about claims arising out of SteelFab's own work, is a red herring—the contract explicitly covers that, but the statute only prohibits indemnifying Prime for Prime's own negligence.
Strategy: When you see an anti-indemnity statute, check the indemnitee's fault percentage. If it's greater than zero, the clause is void to that extent, regardless of contract language about "sole negligence" or "primary responsibility." Read the statute's exact wording—does it void all negligence or just sole negligence?
- Which legal issue is most central to resolving this dispute?
Answer: Whether the settlement credit must be applied before or after reducing the verdict for the passenger's own comparative fault.
This question tests the interplay between a plaintiff's comparative fault and a settlement credit from one tortfeasor. When you see a settlement plus a fault allocation, the central question is almost always the order of math: does the credit come off the top, or after reducing for the plaintiff's own fault?
Here the jury found total damages of $250,000 and Nia 20% at fault. If the court first reduces for Nia's fault, her recovery is $200,000, and then subtracting the $100,000 settlement leaves $100,000. If the court instead subtracts the settlement first, the verdict becomes $150,000, and then a 20% reduction leaves $120,000. That difference is the heart of the dispute. The question is not whether the passenger can be found comparatively at fault for urging the driver to speed—the jury already did that, so that issue is settled. It is also not whether the settlement released Ben; a settlement with one defendant generally does not release another unless the release says so. And itemizing economic versus noneconomic losses is irrelevant to the order-of-reduction problem. Therefore, the legal issue is whether the settlement credit must be applied before or after reducing the verdict for Nia's comparative fault.
Study tip: in multi-defendant cases, always separate the plaintiff's fault reduction from the settlement credit, and ask which statute or rule dictates the sequence—that sequencing often drives the final number.
- Which issue is most central to deciding the promoter's obligation?
Answer: Whether the promoter is jointly and severally liable for the entire injury or only for its own 15% share.
When a tort case ends with a jury allocating fault among multiple defendants, the critical follow-up question is how the judgment will be enforced. That is exactly what this question tests: the difference between several liability, where each defendant pays only its assigned percentage, and joint and several liability, where one defendant can be forced to pay the entire damages even if it was only partly at fault. The promoter's obligation turns on that rule. If the promoter is only several liable, its cap is $15,000; if it is jointly and severally liable, it must pay the full $100,000 and later seek contribution from the insolvent security company. That is why the issue of whether the promoter is jointly and severally liable for the entire injury or only for its own 15% share is central.
The wrong answers miss the real legal question. The security company's insolvency is not a superseding cause of the patron's injury—causation concerns how the harm happened, not whether a defendant can pay. Reallocating the security company's 85% fault to the promoter because it cannot pay is not a general rule; reallocation occurs only if a statute provides for it, and that is simply another way of asking the joint-and-several-liability question. Whether the promoter's inadequate security was a substantial factor was already resolved by the jury's fault finding, so it is no longer the contested issue.
On exam day, when a question involves multiple tortfeasors and an insolvent defendant, immediately ask: joint and several, several only, or several with reallocation? The answer controls the recovery.
- If neither Frank nor Gus can prove that the other's bullet caused Vic's injury, what is Frank's liability?
Answer: Frank is liable for the entire injury because the harm is indivisibleand he cannot prove a distinct portion.
Whenever you see multiple defendants and an indivisible injury, think about burden-shifting. This case tests the "alternative liability" principle as modified by the court's holding in Hernandez: when two negligent actors cause a single indivisible harm, each is jointly and severally liable unless he proves the harm was apportionable and that he caused only a distinct portion. Because Frank and Gus acted independently, Vic need not prove which bullet hit him; the burden falls on each defendant to prove apportionment.
Here, Frank cannot prove that Gus's bullet caused the injury, nor can he prove that only a distinct portion of the harm was his. Since the wound is indivisible, Frank is liable for the entire injury. This is not a 50/50 split by fairness, because the court explicitly places the burden on defendants to prove their own share, not on the plaintiff to measure an equal balance. It is also not a case of no liability: Vic's inability to prove factual causation is excused by the rule. And the rule expressly says concerted action is not required, so Vic need not prove Frank and Gus were acting in concert.
For your study strategy, remember: when negligent actors fire independently and cause an indivisible injury, the defendants bear the burden of apportionment. If none can meet it, each faces full liability. That burden-shifting is the key to answering similar questions correctly.
- What is the most Quinn can recover from Mason?
Answer: $865,000, because Mason is liable for all economic damages and for 55% of the noneconomic damages.
Whenever you see a damages statute with joint and several liability, your first move is to separate economic from noneconomic damages and check the plaintiff's own fault. Here, Quinn is 0% at fault, so § 3(c) applies. Mason is 55% at fault, which meets the 50% threshold, so Mason is jointly and severally liable for all economic damages: the full $700,000. For noneconomic damages, however, § 3(c) keeps liability several only, meaning Mason owes only his 55% share of the $300,000 noneconomic damages: $165,000. Adding those gives $865,000, the most Quinn can recover from Mason. Naylor's insolvency does not shift Naylor's noneconomic share to Mason.
The choice saying Mason owes $1,000,000 is tempting but wrong because it treats the entire judgment as jointly and severally liable; the statute expressly limits noneconomic damages to a percentage share. The choice saying $700,000 wrongly omits Mason's several liability for his 55% of noneconomic damages. The choice saying $550,000 ignores the joint-and-several rule for economic damages and treats Mason as severally liable for everything. Finally, any answer relying only on Mason's 55% share of total damages misses the special statutory trigger for economic damages when the plaintiff is without fault.
On exam day, when you see a comparative-fault statute, immediately split damages into economic and noneconomic categories, then apply the threshold rule separately to each.
- Should the court allow the jury to allocate fault to Ned?
Answer: Yes, because Ned's alleged negligent failure to brake is tortious and Tran permits allocation to immune nonparties.
Whenever you see a question about allocating fault among multiple tortfeasors, the core issue is whether the defendant must shoulder the full loss or can spread it to others, including nonparties. In comparative-fault states, the key is to distinguish "tortious conduct" from "suitability for suit." Here, Tran v. Industrial Supply explicitly holds that a defendant may reduce liability by the fault of a nonparty whose tortious conduct was a proximate cause—even if that nonparty is immune from suit under workers' compensation. Ned's alleged failure to brake is a classic negligence claim: he owed Yolanda a duty, breached it, and caused her injury. So the court should allow the jury to allocate fault to Ned.
The first wrong choice claims Ned's immunity prevents fault allocation. That flips Tran's holding: immunity bars a claim for relief, but fault allocation is only a damages-apportionment device. The second wrong choice says Yolanda's receipt of workers' compensation forecloses co-employee fault. That confuses the plaintiff's remedy against her employer with the defendant's right to apportion fault among all tortfeasors, including immune ones. The last wrong choice insists LiftCo must implead Ned to make the allocation binding. But Tran allows allocation to nonparties directly; no impleader is required, and the jury's allocation can be binding for purposes of reducing LiftCo's liability.
Your study takeaway: when you see "immune nonparty" in a comparative-fault question, remember the exception—fault is allocated only if the nonparty's conduct was tortious because a duty was owed. Immunity does not erase fault.
- What amount may Rex recover from Sam?
Answer: $300,000, because Sam is liable for his 60% share, and the below-share settlement does not increase Sam's liability.
Whenever you see a settlement-and-release question under the Uniform Apportionment Act, focus on the relationship between the settlement amount and the settling tortfeasor's equitable share. Here, Delta's 40% share of $500,000 damages is $200,000. Under § 6(b), Sam's liability is reduced by Delta's equitable share, not by the settlement amount. That gives Sam liability of $300,000 (60% × $500,000). Because Delta's $80,000 settlement is less than its $200,000 share, § 6(c) says the plaintiff bears the shortfall; Sam gets no extra credit and owes no extra amount.
The $420,000 answer incorrectly treats the settlement as a simple dollar-for-dollar credit against the full judgment. That is a pro tanto offset approach, not the UAA's share-based approach. The $220,000 answer double-counts the settlement by subtracting both Delta's 40% share and the $80,000 payment; the shortfall is the plaintiff's loss, not a further reduction in Sam's liability. The $500,000 answer wrongly assumes joint and several liability despite § 6(a), which releases only Delta and, combined with § 6(b), limits Sam to his equitable share.
Study tip: separate the settling tortfeasor's equitable share from the amount actually paid. If the payment exceeds the share, the nonsettler gets a credit for the excess; if it falls short, the plaintiff eats the loss. Then just apply the nonsettler's percentage to total damages.
- Should Paolo recover contribution from Quinton?
Answer: Yes, for $70,000, because Quinton's intentional status does not immunize him from Paolo's contribution claim.
Whenever you see a contribution claim after one tortfeasor has paid a joint and several judgment, start with the statutory equitable shares. Contribution is not about moral blame; it is about whether the payor paid more than that payor's own percentage of fault.
Here, Paolo's equitable share was 30% of $100,000, or $30,000. Because Paolo paid the entire judgment, he paid $70,000 more than his share. Quinton's fault percentage was 70%, so the amount Paolo seeks matches Quinton's equitable share exactly. The fact that Quinton acted intentionally matters only under § 3(c): an intentional tortfeasor has no right to seek contribution from others, but that same subsection expressly says the intentional tortfeasor is not immune from contribution sought by another tortfeasor. Thus Paolo can recover the full $70,000 from Quinton.
The answer saying "No, because an intentional tortfeasor is never subject to contribution" misreads § 3(c): it strips Quinton of his own contribution claim, not his exposure to Paolo's claim. The answer saying "No, because Paolo was also at fault" confuses contribution with comparative-fault immunity; a negligent tortfeasor who paid more than that tortfeasor's share may still seek contribution. The answer saying "Yes, for $50,000, divided equally" is wrong because the statute uses fault percentages, not equal shares.
Study tip: on contribution questions, distinguish "no right to contribution" from "no immunity from contribution." That contrast is the classic intentional-tortfeasor trap.
- Which issue is most central to determining how liability should be apportioned between Theo and Paul?
Answer: Whether Nadia's brain injury and other damages can be reasonably apportioned between the two collisions.
When you see two separate collisions and one plaintiff with multiple injuries, ask whether the harm can be divided. In tort law, a defendant is liable only for the injuries he actually caused, but if an injury is indivisible, each tortfeasor may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire harm. Here, medical experts could attribute the broken leg to the first impact, but they could not determine whether the brain injury occurred in the first collision or in the crash with Paul's truck. So the most central issue is exactly what the correct answer states: whether Nadia's brain injury and other damages can be reasonably apportioned between the two collisions. If they can, Theo and Paul pay only for their respective shares; if not, both may be responsible for the full brain injury.
The other choices miss the apportionment problem. Whether Theo's speeding was the proximate cause of the collision with the truck goes to Theo's liability for that later accident, not to how the injuries should be split. Whether Paul had sufficient time to brake tests Paul's negligence, not whether his collision caused the brain injury. And whether the truck was owned by Paul's employer or by Paul personally could matter only for vicarious liability, not for apportionment between two negligent drivers. On exam day, when two tortfeasors and multiple injuries appear, first separate the injury into caused-by-whom categories; only then discuss indivisible harm.
- Which of the following issues is most central to the warehouse's request?
Answer: Whether the warehouse, after paying more than its allocated share, may obtain contribution from the staffing agency.
Whenever you see one defendant paying an entire judgment after a jury has apportioned fault among multiple tortfeasors, think about contribution. Contribution allows a co-defendant who paid more than its fair share to recover the excess from another co-defendant. Here, the warehouse paid 100% of the judgment even though the jury assigned only 55% fault to the warehouse and 45% to the staffing agency. Because the injury was indivisible and both defendants were jointly liable, the warehouse's payment extinguished the worker's claim against both. The warehouse then has a separate claim against the staffing agency for the 45% share it paid on the agency's behalf. That is why the most central issue is whether the warehouse, after paying more than its allocated share, may obtain contribution from the staffing agency.
The other choices miss the real dispute. Whether the staffing agency's employee was acting within the scope of employment could matter to the agency's original liability, but the jury already assigned 45% fault to the agency, so that issue is not central to reimbursement. Whether the warehouse's payment extinguished the worker's remaining claim is true but beside the point: extinguishment bars the worker from suing again, yet it does not answer whether the warehouse can seek contribution. Whether the warehouse was directly negligent in supervising the temporary employee speaks to the warehouse's own fault, which the jury already accounted for in its 55% share.
On the exam, when a co-defendant pays more than its apportioned share, immediately ask: is this a contribution claim? That label drives the answer.
- Which issue is most central to deciding whether the jury may consider the van driver's fault?
Answer: Whether fault may be apportioned to a nonparty who was not sued and is not before the court.
Whenever you see a question about apportioning fault in a negligence case, the first thing to identify is who is being blamed and whether that person is a party to the lawsuit. The central issue here isn't whether the van driver acted negligently—it's whether the jury can even consider the fault of someone who isn't in the courtroom. The correct answer focuses on this procedural gatekeeping question: whether fault may be apportioned to a nonparty who was not sued and is not before the court. In most comparative-fault jurisdictions, a defendant can assert a nonparty's fault to reduce her own share, but only if she properly pleads it and the nonparty is identified—the van driver's absence doesn't automatically bar apportionment, but the rules for doing so are the real battleground.
Now, look at the distractors. The choice about whether the van driver owed Troy a duty to stop in a position that didn't block Elena's view gets at the merits of the van driver's negligence, but that's irrelevant if the procedural law doesn't permit apportionment to a nonparty. The choice about Troy's speeding being a contributing cause is also a merits question—and it concerns Troy's own fault, not the van driver's, so it doesn't answer whether the van driver can be considered. Similarly, whether Elena's stop-sign violation is negligence per se only addresses Elena's liability, not the apportionment of fault to a third party.
Your study tip: on bar exam torts questions, separate substantive negligence from procedural apportionment. When a nonparty is involved, ask first: "Can this jurisdiction even assign fault to a nonparty?" before ever analyzing duty or causation.
