- Which additional fact, if true, would be most important in determining whether the store's negligence caused Renata's fractured hip?
Answer: The hairline fracture would have progressed to a complete fracture at approximately the same time even if Renata had not fallen.
When negligence is conceded, the remaining battle is causation — specifically, whether the store's conduct was a "but-for" cause of Renata's broken hip. That means asking: would the injury have happened anyway, even without the fall? The most important fact is that the hairline fracture would have progressed to a complete fracture at approximately the same time even if Renata had not fallen. If true, the fall did not cause the hip to break; the pre-existing condition did. The store's negligence may have coincided with the injury, but it was not the cause.
The fact that Renata was looking at her phone does not answer the causation question. It could support a comparative negligence defense, reducing her recovery, but the store already left the ladder negligently, and the issue is what caused the fracture — not who was careless at the moment. Similarly, the employee placing the ladder two feet instead of three feet from the shelf end may show a breach of store policy, but it does nothing to prove that the fall caused the fracture. Renata's osteoporosis and her doctor's advice to use a walker are also not exculpatory; tort law takes plaintiffs as they find them, so a pre-existing vulnerability does not break the causal chain if the fall actually triggered the break.
On causation questions, separate "did the defendant act negligently?" from "did that negligence make the injury happen?" — and watch for facts showing the injury was inevitable on its own.
- Which issue is most important in determining whether the patient can recover from either defendant for the broken guidewire?
Answer: Whether the guidewire broke because the surgeon pulled with excessive force or because the manufacturer supplied a defective wire.
When you see two defendants and an injury that could have been caused by either one, the threshold issue is causation—specifically, which wrongful act actually broke the wire. The surgeon admitted using excessive force, and the manufacturer admitted selling a defective wire, but the expert cannot determine which caused the break. That uncertainty is the heart of the case: unless the patient can prove the surgeon's force or the manufacturer's defect actually caused the break, neither defendant is liable. In some multiple-defendant situations, if both acted tortiously and one caused the harm, the burden of proof may shift to the defendants—but that only matters if the causation question is unresolved. So the most important issue is whether the wire broke because of the surgeon's excessive force or the manufacturer's defective wire.
The choice about the surgeon failing to inspect the wire is not central: surgeons generally are not expected to discover latent manufacturing defects, and even a duty to inspect would not tell us what caused the break. Foreseeability of the second surgery is a damages/proximate-cause issue, but it cannot help until the broken wire is tied to a defendant's wrongful act. And the patient's consent to surgery does not bar claims for a surgeon's negligence or a manufacturer's defective product—consent covers known risks, not excessive force or a hidden defect.
Study tip: in multiple-defendant tort questions, first identify which element of a claim is truly contested. If the facts emphasize uncertainty about the cause, focus on actual causation and any burden-shifting doctrine that may apply.
- Which issue is most important in determining whether Dr. Anand's failure to follow up on the biopsy recommendation caused Naomi's death?
Answer: Whether the eight-month delay allowed Naomi's cancer to progress to a stage at which death was substantially more likely, or whether the cancer would have been fatal even if the biopsy had been performed promptly.
When you see a malpractice question, separate the elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. The doctor's failure may clearly be a breach, but the hardest issue is often causation: did the breach actually cause the harm? Here, both experts agree the biopsy was delayed, but they disagree over whether the delay mattered. That is exactly the causation dispute. The most important issue is therefore whether the eight-month delay allowed the cancer to progress to a stage where death was substantially more likely, or whether the cancer would have been fatal even with a prompt biopsy. If the tumor had already metastasized before the mammogram, the delay did not cause Naomi's death; if prompt biopsy would likely have changed the outcome, it did.
The first choice—whether a reasonably careful primary care physician would have scheduled or referred—addresses breach, the standard-of-care element. Even if the doctor's conduct fell below the standard, Naomi's estate must still prove causation, so this is not the most important issue. The second choice about informed consent to the mammogram misses the point: Naomi's claim is about failing to act on the biopsy recommendation, not about the risks of the imaging itself. Finally, the choice about emotional distress damages concerns a different category of harm; while fear and distress might be recoverable in some cases, the question specifically asks what most determines whether the failure caused Naomi's death. On exam day, when you see dueling experts on outcome, your job is to identify the causal link—not just the doctor's negligence.
- Under Ingram, which of the following is most accurate regarding whether Rosa has established that ChemCo's solvent was a factual cause of her leukemia?
Answer: Rosa has not established factual causation because the evidence shows only that the solvent increased her risk, without evidence permitting the inference that the solvent was a substantial factor in her leukemia.
Whenever you see a toxic tort question involving multiple risk factors, immediately separate general causation (can it cause?) from specific causation (did it cause this plaintiff's disease?). Ingram explicitly rejects using increased risk alone to prove specific causation.
The correct answer is the choice stating Rosa has not established factual causation because the evidence shows only increased risk without a substantial factor inference. Rosa's expert testified the solvent increased her risk by 25% but admitted he could not determine which exposure caused her leukemia. Given her 25-year smoking history (a 12-fold risk increase), the evidence does not permit a jury to infer the solvent was a substantial factor in her disease. This directly satisfies Ingram's requirement.
The choice stating Rosa has established factual causation because the solvent is a recognized cause and increased her risk is wrong because it relies on general causation alone, which Ingram holds is insufficient. The choice arguing the solvent's contribution combined with smoking and that a defendant need not be the sole cause is a tempting trap. While a defendant need not be the sole cause, the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving this defendant's product was a substantial factor. Since the expert explicitly could not determine the actual cause, combining the risk percentages does not provide the necessary evidence of specific causation. The choice claiming but-for causation of the increased risk is wrong because it conflates causing a statistical risk with causing the disease itself. Factual causation requires proof the solvent caused the leukemia, not merely the elevation of risk.
Study tip: Whenever you see "increased risk" or "recognized cause," ask yourself: does this prove a substantial factor in this patient's specific injury, or does it merely establish statistical possibility? If the expert cannot rule out other independent causes, specific causation fails.
- Which of the following questions is most important in determining whether the roofing company is liable for the destruction of the warehouse?
Answer: Whether the torch fire contributed to the destruction of the warehouse even though the lightning fire alone would also have destroyed it.
This question tests causation in negligence, specifically the problem of concurrent independent causes. When two fires would each independently have destroyed the warehouse, the usual "but-for" test fails: Victor's loss would have occurred even without the roofing company's negligence. So courts ask whether the negligent fire was a substantial factor incorrectly causing the harm. The most important question is therefore whether the torch fire contributed to the destruction of the warehouse even though the lightning fire alone would also have destroyed it–contributorily. If yes, the negligence is a cause; if no, it is not.
The wrong answers are traps. The fire-permit question goes to whetherthel roofing company breacheda duty, but negligence is already admitted, so the remaining issue is causation, not standard of care. The lightning-as-superseding-cause argument misreads the doctrine: lightning was not an unforeseeable intervening act occurring after the defendant's negligence; it was an independent concurrent cause operating at nearly the same time, so it does not automatically relieve liability. And Victor's failure to install a sprinkler system concerns comparative fault or failure to mitigate damages, which might reduce his recovery but does not answer whetherthe roofing company caused the loss in the first place.
Strategy tip: When you see two sufficient causes, don't anchor on but-for causation. Ask whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in the harm — concurrent natural causes do not erase liability.
- Which of the following is the most significant legal issue raised by these facts in evaluating whether the doctor's negligence caused the patient's death?
Answer: Whether the doctor's delay caused a loss of a chance of survival, even if the patient would probably have died from the cancer anyway.
Whenever a delayed-diagnosis case gives you survival probabilities both before and after the delay, you are almost certainly looking at the loss-of-chance doctrine. In ordinary tort causation, a plaintiff must show that the negligence probably caused the death. But when a doctor's delay reduces a patient's chance of surviving an already-existing condition, many courts treat that lost chance itself as a compensable injury. Here, the cancer was present and growing at the first visit, and the five-year survival chance dropped from 40% at that time to 15% by later diagnosis. That drop frames the critical causation question: did the doctor's delay cause a loss of a chance of survival, even though death may have been more likely than not anyway? This is exactly the correct choice.
The question about whether failing to order a chest X-ray deviated from the accepted standard of care addresses breach, not causation; it matters for liability generally, but it does not resolve the unique causal problem presented by these probabilities. The smoking-history choice might seem relevant to the patient's baseline risk or comparative fault, but it does not answer whether the delay destroyed a meaningful chance; smoking is already baked into the 40% and 15% figures. The foreseeability choice invokes general proximate-cause language, but the more specific issue is not whether death was foreseeable; it is whether the lost chance itself is legally actionable. So when you see survival probabilities before and after a negligent delay, focus on loss of chance — not breach, not smoking apportionment, and not ordinary foreseeability.
- Under §9, which of the following is most accurate regarding whether Ned's negligence was a factual cause of Marge's pain?
Answer: Ned's negligence was a factual cause of Marge's pain during the period of acceleration, but not of the pain she would have suffered in any event.
Whenever you see a question about causation involving a preexisting condition, focus on the statutory language and the timing of the harm. Here, §9(b) directly addresses acceleration: a defendant is a factual cause of harm suffered during the period of acceleration, but not of harm that would have occurred anyway. Because Ned's negligence caused Marge's pain to begin immediately rather than in two years, the entire two-year period from accident to the natural onset is the "period of acceleration." Under §9(a), the harm (pain) would not have occurred at that earlier time absent Ned's negligence, so he is the factual cause of that accelerated pain. The pain she would have suffered after the two-year mark is not his responsibility.
The choice saying "Ned's negligence was not a factual cause because Marge would have suffered the same severe pain within two years" wrongly ignores §9(b) — it treats "but-for" causation as all-or-nothing, but the statute explicitly creates liability for the acceleration period. The choice claiming Ned is a factual cause of all pain because "a defendant takes the plaintiff as she finds her" is a common torts maxim, but it does not override the statutory apportionment rule; it applies to the extent of harm, not to causation of harm that would occur anyway. Finally, the choice arguing no factual cause because the pain is identical and cannot be separated misunderstands §9(c): that section bars recovery only when the evidence does not permit separation. Here, the statute itself provides the separation — the acceleration period is determinable from the doctors' testimony about the two-year natural progression. The correct answer is the one that tracks §9(b) directly. Remember: when a statute defines causation, apply its specific rules first, not common-law generalities.
- Victor, who had a terminal illness with an expected remaining lifespan of about 12 months, was severely injured when Lena negligently ran a stop sign and struck his car. Emergency physicians testified that the collision did not cause Victor's underlying illness but caused internal bleeding that killed him within 24 hours. Absent the collision, he would have died from the illness in about 12 months. Lena concedes negligence. Under Section 22, which statement best describes Lena's liability, if any, for Victor's death?
Answer: Lena is liable only for the additional harm caused by the acceleration, because the collision hastened Victor's death; she is not liable for the harm that would have occurred later in any event.
This question tests "hastened harm" causation under a statute that treats acceleration as factual cause but limits damages. When you see a plaintiff who was already dying or injured before the defendant acted, remember: causation can still exist if the defendant made the harm occur sooner, but the defendant owes only for the lost time or worsened condition, not the underlying loss.
Here, Victor's terminal illness is not a defense. Section 22(b) says but-for causation is satisfied if the harm would not have occurred at the time it did. Without Lena's collision, Victor would have died in about 12 months; with it, he died within 24 hours. That makes her negligence a factual cause of his death at that earlier time. However, Section 22(c) limits liability to the "additional harm" from acceleration. Lena must compensate for the value of the roughly 12 months of life Victor lost, not for a death that was inevitable.
The wrong answers reflect two main traps. "Lena is not liable, because Victor would have died within a year even absent the collision" ignores the statute's explicit rule that later natural death does not defeat actual causation. Similarly, "her negligence did not cause the terminal illness" misses the point: the negligence caused the internal bleeding that killed him immediately; it need not cause the preexisting condition. Finally, "liable for the full value of the life Victor would have had absent both the illness and the collision" overstates liability by ignoring the limitation in §22(c) and by treating Victor as if he had a healthy lifespan.
On exam day, when a defendant "merely" accelerates an inevitable harm, choose liability for the acceleration only—not full damages, and no liability at all.
- Under the rule in Colton, which of the following is most accurate regarding whether Delia's negligence was a factual cause of the destruction of Paula's home?
Answer: Delia's negligence was not a factual cause because the exception for concurrent sufficient causes applies only when both causes are tortious, and Paula cannot show that the home would not have been destroyed absent Delia's negligence.
Whenever you see a factual causation question, start with but-for causation: would the harm have occurred absent the defendant's conduct? The exception for concurrent sufficient causes allows liability even without but-for proof, but the court in Colton limited that exception to cases where every sufficient cause is tortious. Here, the lightning fire was a sufficient non-tortious cause, so the exception does not apply. Because the home would have been destroyed by the lightning fire alone, Paula cannot prove that Delia's negligence was necessary to the harm. Therefore, Delia was not a factual cause.
The "substantial factor" choice is tempting because that test often appears in multiple-cause cases, but Colton explicitly rejects it when one sufficient cause is non-tortious. Similarly, the choice saying "two independent fires each sufficient to destroy the home merge, each fire is regarded as a cause" states the general concurrent-cause rule but ignores the court's key limitation: the exception applies only when both causes are tortious. The choice about "only if Paula proves that the lightning fire did not also contribute substantially" flips the burden and misstates the test; Paula must prove Delia's conduct was necessary, not disprove the lightning's role. The correct view is the one recognizing that the non-tortious sufficient cause blocks the exception, so but-for causation fails.
Study tip: on causation questions, first ask whether a non-tortious cause alone could have produced the harm—if yes, the concurrent-cause exception may not save the plaintiff.
- Which additional fact, if true, would be most important in determining whether the employee's fire actually caused the destruction?
Answer: The employee's fire was still burning when it reached the barn.
When two fires merge and destroy a single piece of property, you are dealing with concurrent causation. The legal question is whether the defendant's fire was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm, meaning it must have physically contributed to the destruction. The fact that the employee's fire was still burning when it reached the barn is decisive because it proves that the fire was an active, contributing force at the exact moment the barn was destroyed. It didn't merely start a fire that fizzled out; it merged with the lightning fire and played a direct physical role in the loss, satisfying the substantial-factor test.
The farm having been warned twice about the sparks goes to notice and breach of duty—but since the farm already concedes negligence, that fact is irrelevant to causation. Similarly, the lightning fire starting first and being closer might suggest it would have destroyed the barn alone, but that raises only a "but-for" problem. Under the substantial-factor test, the employee's fire can still be a cause even if another fire was sufficient, provided it was actually active at the time of harm. Finally, the barn being insured and the insurer having paid is a collateral-source matter entirely unrelated to whether the employee's fire caused the damage.
On the bar exam, when you see multiple causes, scan for facts showing whether the defendant's conduct was active and contributing at the moment of injury. If the act had ceased or never reached the scene, it cannot be a cause—but if it was still burning, it is a substantial factor.
- Nina was struck by a bullet at a shooting range. Omar and Pete, standing nearby, each negligently fired a handgun in Nina's direction at roughly the same time. One bullet struck Nina. The bullet recovered from Nina was a .22-caliber round. Omar's handgun was a .38-caliber revolver, which cannot fire .22 ammunition; Pete's handgun was a .22-caliber pistol, which could fire that round. No other shooter was present, and both Omar and Pete are before the court. Under Section 18, which defendant or defendants are liable for Nina's injury?
Answer: Pete only, because Omar's .38 revolver could not have fired the recovered .22-caliber bullet, while Pete's .22 pistol could have; Pete has not proven noncausation.
Whenever you see a burden-shifting rule like Section 18, remember its purpose: the plaintiff need not identify which defendant caused the harm if all possible tortfeasors are in court and each was negligent. The burden then falls on each defendant to prove noncausation. Nina satisfies the threshold: both Omar and Pete negligently fired toward her, one bullet struck her, and both are before the court. Omar can meet his burden because his .38 revolver cannot fire a .22-caliber bullet; he is physically incapable of having caused Nina's injury. That leaves Pete's .22 pistol as the only possible source, so Pete has not proved noncausation and is solely liable.
The choice saying "neither Omar nor Pete" misunderstands the statute: Nina does not have to prove which bullet hit her, and the recovered .22-caliber bullet actually excludes Omar. The "both Omar and Pete" choice is wrong because Omar has affirmatively shown noncausation through the caliber mismatch. The "Omar only" choice is illogical: a .38 cannot fire a .22, and the wound-severity theory is unsupported speculation. So Pete only is correct.
Study tip: in alternative-liability questions, identify which defendants are eliminated by physical impossibility; if only one possible cause remains, that defendant carries the burden and loses if they cannot prove noncausation.
- Under Nunez, which of the following is most accurate regarding the burden of proving factual causation in Paul's action against Dan and Earl?
Answer: The burden does not shift; Paul must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dan's bullet caused his injury, and Earl is not a potential tortfeasor because he did not fire a rifle.
Whenever you see multiple negligent actors and an unidentified cause, think about alternative liability. Under Nunez, the burden shifts only if (1) all potential tortfeasors are before the court and (2) their negligent conduct was substantially simultaneous and of the same type. Here, both requirements fail. The bullet recovered from Paul was .22 caliber, so Earl's shotgun could not have fired it; Earl is not a potential tortfeasor. The other potential tortfeasor is Frank, who also fired a .22 rifle, but Frank fled and is not before the court. Because not all potential tortfeasors are present, the burden does not shift. Paul must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dan's bullet caused his injury.
The statement that the burden shifts to Dan and Earl because Paul cannot identify the shooter ignores Nunez's all-tortfeasors requirement and also treats Earl as a potential tortfeasor when his shotgun could not have caused a .22-caliber injury. The statement that the burden shifts only to Dan, who must prove Frank's bullet struck Paul, is similarly flawed: Frank's absence from the case prevents any shift, and Dan does not have the burden to prove Frank's identity or conduct. Finally, the statement that the burden shifts to Dan and Earl because all three hunters acted negligently and fired simultaneously repeats those errors—Frank is not before the court, Earl did not fire a rifle, and simultaneous negligence alone is insufficient.
On this exam, when a burden-shifting rule appears, first list every potential tortfeasor and check whether all are before the court and whether their conduct matches the injury mechanism. If any potential actor is missing, the plaintiff keeps the burden.
- Under §4, which of the following is most accurate regarding the estate's claim?
Answer: The estate may not recover under §4 because the patient's opportunity for a better outcome before the negligence was 45%, not greater than 50%.
This question tests how a statutory "lost chance of survival" claim works. Whenever you see such a statute, check the threshold eligibility rule first: before the negligence, did the patient have a greater-than-50% opportunity for a better outcome? Only if that precondition is met do you move on to causation and percentage damages.
Here, the patient had a 45% chance of survival before the doctor's negligent failure. Section 4(b) says the plaintiff may not recover unless that pre-negligence opportunity was greater than 50%. The estate therefore fails at the threshold. The later drop from 45% to 10% and the doctor's negligence being a substantial factor are relevant facts, but they cannot overcome the statute's explicit bar.
The choice saying the estate may recover 35% of wrongful-death damages incorrectly applies the subsection (c) percentage formula without satisfying subsection (b). The "full amount" choice wrongly equates substantial-factor causation with full wrongful-death recovery; §4 creates a limited remedy, not a replacement for the statutory threshold. The "delay did not cause the cancer" choice misunderstands the nature of lost-chance claims—the doctor need not cause the underlying disease, only negligently reduce the patient's opportunity for a better outcome. The correct conclusion is that recovery is barred because 45% is not greater than 50%.
Study tip: read statutory elements in order. A threshold like "greater than 50%" can dispose of the claim before you ever reach causation or damages—don't let sympathetic facts pull you past the statutory requirement.
- Which issue is most important in determining whether the inadequate warning caused Petra's injuries?
Answer: Whether an adequate warning against combining the drug with alcohol would have caused Petra to avoid drinking or driving after taking the drug on the night of the accident.
When a product-liability claim rests on an inadequate warning, the causation question is not whether the drug caused the harm, but whether the missing warning caused the harm. The key inquiry is "but-for": would the plaintiff have acted differently if the warning had been given? That is exactly what matters here. Petra admitted in her deposition that she often drank wine after taking sleep aids and probably would not have changed her behavior even with an alcohol warning. If true, the inadequate label did not cause her injuries—her injury would have occurred anyway—so the warning issue turns on whether an adequate warning would have made her avoid drinking or driving that night.
The blood alcohol concentration choice misses the point: a legal-limit violation might support comparative fault, but it does not tell you whether the warning itself caused the accident. Similarly, whether PharmaCo knew users combined the drug with alcohol goes to duty and breach—whether the warning was inadequate—not to causation. The superseding-cause option is also off; Petra's driving after drinking was not unexpected, and the question is whether the faulty warning caused her conduct, not whether her conduct was an independent event.
On the bar exam, separate causation from breach: first ask what the defendant failed to warn, then ask whether that failure changed the plaintiff's conduct. A plaintiff's own testimony that she would not have heeded the warning is often fatal to causation.
- Which additional fact, if true, would most undermine the estate's claim that the physician's failure caused Marco's death?
Answer: The aneurysm could not have been detected on a CT scan at the time Marco was in the emergency room.
Whenever you see a causation question in a malpractice case, separate the two required links: the doctor's breach and the patient's harm. The estate must show that if the CT scan had been ordered, Marco likely would have survived. The fact that the aneurysm could not have been detected on a CT scan at the time he was in the ER severs that link completely. If the scan would have shown nothing, then ordering it would not have changed the treatment, so the physician's failure did not cause the death.
The other choices miss this causal link. The physician being on duty for eighteen hours and required to take a break after seeing Marco goes to physician fatigue or hospital policy, not to whether the missed scan caused death. The CT technician taking twenty minutes to arrive is likewise about delay, but if the aneurysm was undetectable, timing does not matter. Marco not having seen a doctor for five years might suggest preexisting health neglect, but it does not explain how the physician's specific failure to order a CT caused the fatal outcome.
On causation questions, ask: "Even if the defendant had done the right thing, would the harm still have occurred?" If yes, there is no but-for causation. Here, the undetectable aneurysm is the strongest answer because it makes the alleged breach harmless. On exam day, watch for facts that attack causation rather than duty or breach—they are often hidden in answer choices that sound like negligence but do not actually connect the doctor's error to the injury.
- Which additional fact, if true, would most help D show his bullet did not cause P's injury?
Answer: The entry wound was on P's right side, and D had been standing to P's left.
When you see a multiple-shooter torts question, focus on but-for causation: would P's injury have occurred even if D had not fired? Both D and R fired, so the evidence must link the actual bullet to one shooter. The strongest fact is the wound's location. P's entry wound was on his right side, and D was standing to P's left. A bullet from D, coming from the left, would ordinarily have entered on P's left side or traveled left-to-right through the body. An entry wound on the right therefore points toward R, who was on the opposite side, and helps show D's bullet was not the cause. The fragmented bullet does not help because it creates no directional link; it simply means the projectile cannot be identified. R's higher muzzle velocity is also unhelpful—velocity alone does not tell you whose bullet hit P or where it entered. D's custom trigger with a lighter pull is worse than irrelevant: it concerns D's ease of firing, not whether his bullet caused the wound, and could even suggest D fired more readily. On causation questions, look for physical-trajectory evidence—entry wound, shooter position, bullet path—rather than weapon characteristics or inability to test. Ask: would the injury have happened anyway without D's shot? If yes, D is not a but-for cause.
- Piper, a commercial nursery owner, sued Ajax Chemical and Bass Transport after her irrigation well became unusable. Ajax negligently spilled solvent into groundwater on June 1; tests showed that by June 5 the Ajax solvent alone had already made the well unusable. On June 10, Bass negligently spilled an identical solvent into the same aquifer; that solvent would also have made the well unusable by itself, and it reached Piper's well on June 12. The well remained unusable thereafter. Neither Ajax nor Bass contests that its spill was tortious. Under Section 7, which defendant or defendants are factual causes of Piper's harm?
Answer: Ajax only, because Ajax's spill occurred before the harm was complete; Bass's spill occurred after the harm was complete and did not hasten or worsen the harm.
This question tests factual causation under Section 7, specifically how timing affects otherwise sufficient causes. The key move is to separate "could have caused the harm" from "actually caused the harm that already occurred." Ajax's spill is a clear factual cause: by June 5, the Ajax solvent alone had already made the well unusable, so the harm occurred absent? No—rather, the harm occurred because of Ajax's conduct, and it was complete by June 5. Bass's spill on June 10 came after that harm was complete, and although it would independently have made the well unusable, the statute says an act after the harm is complete that neither hastens nor worsens the harm is not a factual cause. Section 7(b) does not save Bass because it requires the acts to have operated concurrently and before the harm was complete. Therefore Ajax only.
The choice saying "Neither Ajax nor Bass" is wrong because Ajax's spill actually did cause the harm; the absence of Bass's spill would not undo Ajax's causation. "Bass only" is wrong because Ajax did not cease being a cause merely because its force had already produced the harm. "Ajax and Bass" is the tempting answer because each spill alone was sufficient, but it ignores the explicit statutory timing requirement: concurrent sufficient causes must each occur before the harm is complete.
On causation questions, always check the timeline: when was the harm complete, and did each defendant's act occur before that moment? A later independent cause that could have caused the same harm is not a factual cause if it neither hastens nor worsens the already-completed injury.
- Dr. Gray negligently failed to report a suspicious mass shown on a June 1 CT scan until August 1. By then, Patient's cancer had spread. At trial, an oncologist testified that with proper treatment beginning June 1, Patient would have had a 22% chance of surviving five years; with treatment beginning August 1, her chance was 6%. Patient died four months after the delayed diagnosis. Her estate sued Dr. Gray for wrongful death. Under Section 12, can the estate establish factual causation, and if so, what damages may it recover?
Answer: Yes, because the delay reduced her chance of survival from 22% to 6%; the estate may recover 16% of the total damages for her physical harm.
This is a statutory loss-of-chance question under Section 12, so the key is applying the statute's specific threshold and damages formula, not ordinary but-for causation rules. Section 12 allows factual causation when a defendant's conduct reduces a chance that was greater than 10% at the time of the tortious conduct. It does not require proof that the patient would have survived under a more-likely-than-not standard.
Here, Patient's chance with June treatment was 22%, and with August treatment it fell to 6%. Because 22% exceeds 10%, the delay satisfies Section 12(a); the chance was reduced by 16 percentage points. Under Section 12(b), damages are measured by multiplying the total damages for Patient's physical harm—here, the wrongful-death damages—by that 16% reduction. So the estate may recover 16% of those damages.
The answer claiming "No, because the chance of survival was below 50%" misses the statute's purpose: loss of chance is recoverable even when the lost chance was less than 50%, as long as it exceeded 10%. The answer saying the estate "may recover 22%" confuses the original chance she had with the percentage-point reduction actually caused by the delay; the statute measures the loss, not the starting chance. And the answer saying the estate may recover "the entire total damages" ignores Section 12(b)'s explicit proportionate formula and overstates causation—Patient retained a 6% chance even with the delay, so her estate may recover only the value of the 16-point chance lost, not full wrongful-death damages.
For Section 12 questions, always identify the starting chance, the later chance, and whether the starting chance exceeds 10%. Then apply the formula: reduce total damages by the percentage-point reduction, not by the original chance.
