Confession and privilege against self-incrimination [Fifth Amendment] - Next Generation Bar Exam
- Under New York v. Quarles, when may police question a suspect in custody without Miranda warnings?
- When reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety. Quarles involved a question about the location of a discarded gun.
- Under Missouri v. Seibert, what is the status of statements obtained by a deliberate question-first, warn-later strategy?
- The post-warning statements are inadmissible unless curative measures were taken. The midstream warning cannot function effectively when used deliberately to undermine Miranda.
- Under Berghuis v. Thompkins, how must a suspect invoke the right to remain silent?
- Unambiguously. Police must then scrupulously honor the invocation.
- Under United States v. Patane, what is the status of physical evidence derived from a voluntary statement taken without Miranda warnings?
- It is admissible. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply to physical fruits of a mere Miranda violation.
- What is required for a valid waiver of Miranda rights?
- A knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, which may be implied from the suspect's course of conduct. A suspect who understands the warnings and then answers questions may impliedly waive.
- What two conditions trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings?
- Custody and interrogation. Statements volunteered without interrogation, or made outside custody, do not require warnings.
- What is the test for custody under Miranda?
- Whether a reasonable person would not feel free to end the questioning and leave, under restraints like a formal arrest. A routine traffic stop is not custody for Miranda purposes.
- Under Edwards v. Arizona, what must happen after a suspect in custody invokes the right to counsel?
- Interrogation must stop until counsel is present, unless the suspect initiates further communication. Under Maryland v. Shatzer, the Edwards protection ends after a 14-day break in custody.
- Under Harris v. New York, for what purpose may a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda be used?
- To impeach the defendant's trial testimony. The statement remains inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
- Under Colorado v. Connelly, what is required for a confession to be involuntary under due process?
- Coercive police activity. An involuntary confession is inadmissible for all purposes, including impeachment.
- What must Miranda warnings convey?
- The right to remain silent, that statements may be used in court, the right to an attorney, and appointed counsel if indigent. No precise wording is required, so long as the substance is reasonably conveyed.
- Under Griffin v. California, what may the prosecution not do regarding a defendant who does not testify?
- Comment on the defendant's failure to testify. On request, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that no inference may be drawn.
- Under Rhode Island v. Innis, what is interrogation?
- Express questioning, or words or actions police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The focus is on the suspect's perceptions, not the officers' intent.
- What kind of evidence does the privilege against self-incrimination protect?
- Testimonial or communicative evidence, not physical evidence such as blood samples or voice exemplars. Compelled production of documents may be testimonial if the act of production itself communicates facts.