- Can the passenger's estate establish a breach of duty through negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the 15-year-old's statutory violation was not the actual or proximate cause of the passenger's death.
Even if a statutory violation establishes negligence per se (breach of duty), the plaintiff must still prove that the violation was the actual and proximate cause of the harm. Here, the boat capsized due to an unforeseeable, powerful gust of wind, not due to the operator's age or any lack of skill on his part. The facts state he was operating the boat carefully. The harm would have occurred even if a 25-year-old had been driving. Since the statutory violation (being 15) was not the cause-in-fact or proximate cause of the drowning, the negligence claim will fail, even if a breach is established per se.
- Is the tourist likely to succeed in establishing breach of duty through negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the tourist was not a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect.
For negligence per se to apply, the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. The facts state the law was intended to protect farmworkers from pesticide exposure. The injured plaintiff was a tourist, not a farmworker. Since she is outside the protected class, she cannot use the pilot's statutory violation to establish negligence per se.
- What is the likely effect of the defendant's violation of the licensing statute on the issue of breach of duty? Select one.
Answer: It will be irrelevant to the issue of whether the defendant breached the standard of care during the surgery.
Courts generally hold that the violation of a licensing statute does not establish negligence per se with respect to the manner in which an activity is performed. While the statute is designed to protect the public, its purpose is to ensure a minimum level of competence before one engages in the profession. The breach of duty in a malpractice case is determined by whether the practitioner met the standard of care of a reasonable professional in that field, not by their licensing status. The patient must still present evidence that the defendant's conduct during the surgery fell below that standard. The lack of a license itself does not prove the surgery was performed negligently.
- You are representing the patron. What is your strongest argument for establishing the restaurant's breach of duty? Select one.
Answer: Argue that the restaurant's violation of the health code constitutes negligence per se.
This is a direct application of negligence per se. The health code sets a specific safety standard. The patron is in the class of persons the code is meant to protect (restaurant customers), and the harm (food poisoning) is precisely the type of harm the temperature requirement is designed to prevent. The restaurant's violation of the code provides a direct path to establishing duty and breach, which is typically stronger and more straightforward than relying on res ipsa loquitur or proving a breach of the general duty of care. While a strict liability argument might be possible for a product, negligence per se is the most direct argument based on the facts provided.
- Is the construction company likely to be found liable on a theory of negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the arsonist's status as a trespasser engaged in a crime may place him outside the class of persons protected by the statute.
Courts are often reluctant to allow a plaintiff engaged in a criminal act to benefit from the protection of a safety statute. Although the statute's language may be broad (e.g., protecting "any person"), a court could interpret the legislative intent as not extending protection to those on the property for an unlawful purpose, such as an arsonist. This plaintiff would likely be considered outside the class of persons the statute was designed to protect. While property owners owe some duties to trespassers, using negligence per se is a distinct issue that depends on the statute's purpose.
- Is the court likely to allow the driver's statutory violation to be used to establish negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the purpose of the emissions statute is to protect the environment, not to prevent traffic collisions.
The critical link for negligence per se is between the purpose of the statute and the harm that occurred. An emissions-test statute is designed to prevent air pollution. Its purpose is environmental protection. It is not designed to regulate the safe operation of vehicles or prevent collisions. Because the harm suffered by the motorcyclist (injury from a collision) is not the type of harm the emissions statute was designed to prevent, the violation of that statute is irrelevant to the negligence claim and cannot be used to establish negligence per se.
- In the lawsuit, is the driver's violation of the traffic law likely to be considered negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the driver's violation of the statute was excused by the sudden emergency.
A statutory violation may be excused and will not constitute negligence per se if compliance with the statute would have involved a greater danger than the violation. This is often framed as the sudden emergency doctrine. Here, the driver swerved across the line to avoid hitting a child who darted into the road. A reasonable person would likely find that hitting the child would have been a greater danger than crossing the line. Therefore, the driver's violation is likely to be excused, and negligence per se will not apply. The jury would then evaluate his conduct under the general reasonable person standard in an emergency.
- In the lawsuit, how will the cyclist's statutory violation likely affect her claim? Select one.
Answer: It will have no effect on her claim because the driver would not have seen her even if she had a front light.
Even when a party's statutory violation establishes a breach of duty (here, contributory negligence per se), that breach must be a cause-in-fact of the harm. The purpose of a front light is to make the bicycle visible to oncoming traffic. Here, the driver was texting and not looking at the road at all. The evidence suggests that even if the cyclist had a front light, the inattentive driver would not have seen it. Therefore, the cyclist's statutory violation was not a cause-in-fact of the collision, and it will not affect her claim against the driver.
- Assuming the pedestrian can prove the fall was caused by the ice, what is the effect of the owner's violation of the ordinance? Select one.
Answer: It establishes a breach of duty, as the ordinance's purpose is to prevent this type of harm to pedestrians.
Many jurisdictions have abandoned the common law rule and allow ordinances to create a duty for property owners to clear public sidewalks. Assuming this is such a jurisdiction, the ordinance creates a specific safety standard. The purpose is to protect pedestrians (the class of person) from slipping and falling on ice (the type of harm). The bookstore owner's unexcused violation of this ordinance constitutes negligence per se, establishing both duty and breach. The pedestrian still must prove causation and damages.
- In the tenant's lawsuit, what is the most likely legal effect of the owner's statutory violation? Select one.
Answer: It will conclusively establish the owner's duty and breach of duty, leaving the tenant to prove causation and damages.
The doctrine of negligence per se applies when a defendant violates a statute, the plaintiff is in the class of persons the statute is designed to protect, and the harm is the type the statute is designed to prevent. Here, the statute is designed to protect tenants (class of person) from falling on stairs (type of harm). The tenant's fall is exactly the kind of harm the statute aimed to prevent. In most jurisdictions, an unexcused violation of such a statute conclusively establishes the first two elements of a negligence claim: duty and breach. The plaintiff must still establish that the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the injuries and prove damages.
- Will the store's violation of the statute likely constitute negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the statute is designed to prevent accidental spills or ingestion by young children, not intentional arson by an older child.
This question tests the "type of harm" prong of negligence per se. Child-resistant cap statutes are generally intended to prevent young children from accidentally ingesting or spilling toxic substances. The harm that occurred here—burns from intentional arson by a ten-year-old—is arguably not the type of harm the legislature intended to prevent. While the plaintiff is a child, the deliberate and dangerous nature of his act may place it outside the scope of risks the statute was designed to address, which are more focused on accidental exposure.
- What is the most probable effect of the ski resort's failure to mark the trail in the skier's lawsuit? Select one.
Answer: It will be conclusive evidence of the resort's duty and breach, as the statute is designed to prevent this exact type of accident.
The statute sets a specific safety standard for ski resorts. The skier is in the class of persons the statute is intended to protect (skiers). The harm—skiing off the trail and getting injured—is precisely the type of harm the boundary marker requirement is designed to prevent. Therefore, the resort's unexcused violation constitutes negligence per se. While skiing has inherent risks, this doctrine usually does not shield an operator from liability for failing to comply with specific safety statutes. The whiteout is a foreseeable condition at a ski resort and would be an intervening, not superseding, cause.
- What is the strongest argument that the bar breached a duty to the injured driver based on the statute? Select one.
Answer: The statute establishes a duty and its breach because the driver was a foreseeable victim of the patron's intoxicated driving.
This is a classic application of negligence per se via a "dram shop act." The statute is designed to protect the public, including other drivers, from the foreseeable dangers posed by intoxicated individuals. The injured driver is a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect (the general public on the roads), and the harm (injury from a drunk driving accident) is precisely the type of harm the statute was intended to prevent. Therefore, the bar's violation of the statute establishes its duty and breach.
- In her negligence action, what is the cyclist's best argument that the company is liable? Select one.
Answer: The driver's statutory violation constitutes negligence per se, and the thief's actions were a foreseeable intervening force.
The "keys-in-ignition" statute is designed to prevent theft and the ensuing danger to the public from a thief driving recklessly. The cyclist is a member of the public, and the harm is the type the statute aims to prevent. Thus, the driver's violation is negligence per se, establishing breach. The key remaining issue is proximate cause. A thief's reckless driving is a foreseeable consequence of leaving a truck running in a high-crime area. Because the intervening criminal act was foreseeable, it is not a superseding cause and will not cut off the defendant's liability. Therefore, the best argument combines negligence per se for breach with foreseeability for proximate cause.
- Is the bicyclist likely to prevail on a negligence per se theory? Select one.
Answer: No, because the bicyclist is not a member of the class the ordinance was intended to protect.
The doctrine of negligence per se is rooted in legislative intent. The ordinance was passed to protect horses by providing them with water. A modern-day bicyclist is not a horse and is therefore not a member of the class of persons (or animals) the ordinance was designed to protect. Furthermore, the harm the ordinance was designed to prevent was dehydration in horses, not physical injury to bicyclists from collisions. Because neither prong of the negligence per se test is met, the theory will fail.
- Can the motorist use the company's violation of the federal regulation to establish a breach of duty? Select one.
Answer: No, because the harm that occurred was not the type of harm the regulation was designed to prevent.
The doctrine of negligence per se requires that the harm suffered be the type of harm the statute or regulation was designed to prevent. The regulation required a fire extinguisher, indicating its purpose was to prevent or mitigate harm from fires. The motorist was injured in a collision and crushing incident, not a fire. Because the harm that occurred (impact damage) was different from the harm the regulation was designed to prevent (fire damage), the violation of the regulation cannot be used to establish negligence per se.
- In the family's suit against the electrician, what is the legal significance of the electrician's violation of the fire code? Select one.
Answer: It is conclusive proof of the electrician's breach of duty.
Building and fire codes are safety statutes designed to protect the occupants and owners of buildings from fire and structural collapse. The family, as subsequent purchasers and occupants, are within the class of persons the code is intended to protect. The harm, a fire caused by faulty wiring, is exactly the type of harm the code is designed to prevent. Therefore, the electrician's unexcused violation of the fire code constitutes negligence per se, which is conclusive proof of duty and breach. The electrician remains liable for his own torts, even as an independent contractor.
- In the customer's negligence action, the pharmacist's failure to label the container with the patient's name will most likely be deemed: Select one.
Answer: Conclusive proof of breach of duty, because the harm was a foreseeable result of the statutory violation.
The labeling statute is a safety measure designed to prevent patients from taking the wrong medication, among other errors. The plaintiff (the customer) is in the protected class. The harm (injury from taking the wrong medication) is precisely the type of harm that clear labeling is meant to prevent. The risk of a patient confusing their medication with another's is a foreseeable consequence of failing to label it with a name. Therefore, the violation of the statute will establish negligence per se, which is conclusive proof of duty and breach.
- Will the parents likely succeed in using the homeowner's violation of the ordinance to establish negligence per se? Select one.
Answer: No, because the harm suffered by the child was not the type of harm the ordinance was designed to prevent.
For negligence per se to apply, the plaintiff's harm must be the type of harm the statute was intended to prevent. Here, the ordinance was explicitly enacted to prevent children from drowning. The child suffered a concussion from falling off a statue, which is not the harm of drowning. While the child is in the protected class (children), the type-of-harm requirement is not met. Therefore, the statutory violation cannot be used to establish negligence per se.
