Proximate Cause — Apply foreseeability - Bar Exam Uniform

SECTION 1

Historical Context & Motivation

The doctrine of proximate cause arose from the fundamental need to impose rational limits on tort liability. Without some limiting principle, a negligent actor could be held responsible for an infinite chain of consequences radiating outward from the initial wrongful act. Early common law courts recognized that cause-in-fact alone was insufficient to justify the imposition of liability, because even a trivial act of negligence could, through an improbable sequence of events, produce catastrophic results far removed from the defendant's conduct. The question, then, became one of drawing a principled boundary—determining at what point the causal chain becomes too attenuated to support legal responsibility.

The concept of foreseeability emerged as the dominant test for proximate cause in American tort law, though it competed with other formulations such as the "direct cause" test. The evolution of this doctrine reflects a broader jurisprudential tension between expanding compensation for injured parties and protecting defendants from liability for consequences they could not reasonably have anticipated. Understanding this history is essential for applying foreseeability analysis on the bar exam, where examiners frequently test the boundaries of this doctrine through nuanced fact patterns.

1850 • Ryan v. New York Central Railroad

The New York Court of Appeals limited liability for fire damage to the first building ignited, reasoning that damage to more remote structures was too "remote" from the defendant's negligence. This early case illustrated the courts' instinct to cabin liability through causal analysis.

1921 • In re Polemis (UK)

The English Court of Appeal adopted the direct cause test, holding that a defendant was liable for all direct consequences of negligence, regardless of foreseeability. This approach was later rejected in Wagon Mound.

1928 • Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.

Judge Cardozo's majority opinion established that a defendant owes a duty only to foreseeable plaintiffs within the zone of danger. This landmark case embedded foreseeability as the central organizing principle for both duty and proximate cause analysis in American tort law.

1961 • Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock (Wagon Mound No. 1)

The Privy Council overruled Polemis, holding that liability extends only to the kind of damage that was reasonably foreseeable. This decision aligned the Commonwealth approach with the American foreseeability standard.

2010 • Restatement (Third) of Torts

The ALI adopted the "scope of liability" framework, reconceptualizing proximate cause by asking whether the harm that occurred was among the risks that made the defendant's conduct tortious. This modern approach refines, but does not abandon, foreseeability analysis.

The central question that proximate cause doctrine addresses is this: given that the defendant's conduct was a factual cause of the plaintiff's injury, should the law hold the defendant responsible for that particular consequence? The foreseeability test provides the answer by asking whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have anticipated the general type of harm that occurred. This inquiry operates as a policy lever, reflecting the legal system's judgment about the appropriate scope of negligence liability.

SECTION 2

Core Principles & Definitions

Proximate cause—sometimes called legal cause—is the second element of the causation requirement in negligence. Before reaching the proximate cause inquiry, the plaintiff must first establish cause-in-fact (also called "actual cause" or "but-for cause"), which asks whether the plaintiff's injury would have occurred absent the defendant's negligence. Proximate cause then superimposes a normative limitation, filtering out consequences that are too remote, too attenuated, or too bizarre to justify holding the defendant liable. The foreseeability standard provides the dominant framework for this filtering function, though its application requires sensitivity to context and a firm grasp of the doctrinal sub-rules that govern intervening causes, the eggshell-skull plaintiff, and the type-versus-extent-of-harm distinction.

Foreseeability of the Type of Harm

The defendant is liable if the general type or kind of harm was foreseeable, even if the precise manner or extent was not. A reasonable person need not foresee the exact sequence of events—only the broad category of risk.

Foreseeable Plaintiff (Zone of Danger)

Under the Cardozo/Palsgraf approach, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons foreseeably endangered by the defendant's conduct. A defendant may owe no duty—and thus have no proximate cause issue—if the plaintiff was entirely unforeseeable.

Intervening & Superseding Causes

An intervening cause is any force that operates after the defendant's negligence. If the intervening cause was foreseeable, it does not break the causal chain. Only an unforeseeable, superseding cause severs proximate cause.

Eggshell-Skull Rule

A defendant takes the plaintiff as found. Once a foreseeable type of harm occurs to a foreseeable plaintiff, the defendant is liable for the full extent of injury—even if the severity was unforeseeable due to a preexisting condition.

Scope of Liability (Restatement Third)

The modern Restatement (Third) reframes the inquiry: was the harm that occurred among the risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent? This "risk standard" is functionally similar to foreseeability but sharpens the analytical lens.

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KEY TAKEAWAY

Think of proximate cause as a filter at the end of a pipeline. Cause-in-fact is the pipeline itself—it connects defendant to plaintiff. But the filter (foreseeability) screens out bizarre, fantastical outcomes while letting through consequences within the range of ordinary anticipation. Just as an engineer designs a water filter to block particles above a certain size, foreseeability blocks liability for harms above a certain threshold of improbability. However, once the type of harm passes through the filter, the eggshell-skull rule ensures that the full magnitude of damage flows through, regardless of the plaintiff's unusual vulnerabilities.

SECTION 3

Visual Explanation — The Foreseeability Analysis Flowchart

This flowchart traces the proximate cause analysis from the initial finding of negligence through the foreseeability inquiry. Notice how the analysis branches at each decision point: foreseeability of harm type is tested first, followed by an inquiry into intervening causes. The eggshell-skull rule (dashed box) operates as a separate principle that applies once proximate cause is established.

The flowchart above illustrates the sequential nature of the proximate cause inquiry. The analysis proceeds in a structured order, and the outcome at each node determines the next question. The first critical gate is cause-in-fact: if the defendant's conduct was not a but-for cause of the plaintiff's injury, the analysis terminates without ever reaching proximate cause. Assuming factual causation is established, the court turns to the central foreseeability question—whether the general category of harm was within the scope of risks created by the defendant's negligence. If an intervening cause is present, the court must further determine whether that intervening event was itself foreseeable; only a truly unforeseeable intervening cause (a superseding cause) will break the chain of proximate causation.

SECTION 4

The Mechanism of Foreseeability Analysis

The Objective Standard: The Reasonable Person

Foreseeability in proximate cause is measured by an objective standard: what a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have foreseen as a probable consequence of the negligent act. The inquiry is not whether this particular defendant actually foresaw the harm, nor is it whether the harm was theoretically possible. Rather, the question is whether the outcome was within the range of consequences that a person of reasonable foresight would have anticipated. This standard operates at a level of generality—the law does not require that the defendant foresee the precise mechanism of injury, the exact plaintiff, or the specific quantum of damages.

Type vs. Extent of Harm

One of the most frequently tested distinctions on the bar exam is between the type of harm and the extent of harm. Proximate cause requires only that the general type of harm be foreseeable. If a defendant negligently operates a vehicle and strikes a pedestrian, the foreseeable type of harm is physical injury. The fact that the pedestrian suffers an unexpectedly severe injury—perhaps because of a preexisting condition like hemophilia—does not defeat proximate cause. The eggshell-skull rule ensures that once the type of harm is foreseeable, the defendant bears responsibility for the full extent, no matter how disproportionate.

Intervening Causes: Foreseeable vs. Superseding

An intervening cause is any independent force that operates between the defendant's negligent act and the plaintiff's injury. Intervening causes are ubiquitous—medical treatment for an injury, subsequent negligence by a third party, or even a natural event like a storm. The critical question is whether the intervening cause was foreseeable. Courts generally treat the following as foreseeable intervening causes that do not break the chain: subsequent medical malpractice, rescue attempts, reactions of other drivers to a hazard, and criminal acts in certain contexts (e.g., a landlord's negligent failure to secure a building). Conversely, superseding causes—those that are extraordinary, unforeseeable, and independent—sever proximate causation. A lightning strike that ignites a gasoline spill caused by the defendant's negligence might be superseding if the weather conditions provided no warning.

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Bar Exam Tip

When analyzing an MBE question involving intervening causes, apply a two-step analysis: (1) identify the intervening force, and (2) ask whether that force was foreseeable. Remember that intentional criminal acts by third parties are generally superseding unless the defendant's negligence specifically created the risk of such criminal conduct (e.g., negligent security).

The Restatement (Third) "Risk Standard"

The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010) reframes proximate cause as "scope of liability" and employs the risk standard: an actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious. This formulation directs attention to the specific risk that the duty was designed to prevent. For example, if a statute requires fencing around swimming pools to prevent children from drowning, a defendant who violates the statute is liable if a child drowns but not if an adult trips over a misplaced fence post. The risk standard is not a departure from foreseeability but rather a more precise articulation of the same underlying principle.

SECTION 5

Classifying Intervening Causes

One of the most challenging aspects of the foreseeability analysis is determining whether a particular intervening cause is foreseeable (and therefore does not break the chain) or superseding (and therefore severs proximate cause). The classification depends on context, and courts have developed patterns through case law that provide useful guidance for bar exam preparation. The diagram below categorizes the most common types of intervening causes along a spectrum from highly foreseeable to clearly superseding.

This diagram maps common intervening causes along a spectrum from foreseeable (green, left) to superseding (red, right), with context-dependent situations in the middle (amber). The bottom panel highlights three key principles frequently tested on the bar exam.

Intervening Cause	Typically Foreseeable?	Rationale
Subsequent medical malpractice	Yes	Medical treatment is a natural consequence of the initial injury; negligent treatment is a foreseeable risk of seeking care.
Rescue attempts	Yes	"Danger invites rescue." The original tortfeasor is liable for injuries to rescuers unless the rescue was reckless.
Third-party criminal acts	Context-dependent	Generally superseding, but foreseeable if D's negligence specifically created the risk (e.g., negligent security in a high-crime area).
Acts of God / natural forces	Context-dependent	Ordinary weather is foreseeable; extraordinary events (tornado, earthquake) are typically superseding.
Plaintiff's own negligence	Yes (usually)	Generally treated under comparative fault rather than proximate cause. P's own carelessness rarely breaks the chain.

Common Intervening Causes and Their Classification

SECTION 6

Worked Example — Applying Foreseeability

Consider the following fact pattern, which is representative of the type of proximate cause question that appears on the Multistate Bar Examination.

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Hypothetical

Delta, a delivery driver, negligently runs a red light and collides with Petra's car at an intersection. Petra suffers a broken arm and is transported by ambulance to the hospital. At the hospital, Dr. Epsilon negligently sets the bone, causing Petra to develop a serious infection that requires additional surgery. Meanwhile, the collision had caused a gasoline spill at the intersection. Thirty minutes later, Franco, a passerby, discards a lit cigarette into the spill, igniting a fire that damages a nearby storefront owned by Gamma. Gamma sues Delta for the fire damage. Petra also sues Delta for the infection-related injuries. Analyze proximate cause for both claims.

Foreseeability Analysis: Petra's Claim (Infection from Medical Malpractice)

1
Step 1 — Establish Cause-in-Fact

Apply the but-for test: but for Delta's negligent running of the red light, Petra would not have been injured and would not have required medical treatment. Therefore, Delta's negligence is a cause-in-fact of Petra's subsequent infection.

Cause-in-fact: ESTABLISHED
2
Step 2 — Identify the Type of Harm

The general type of harm is physical injury. Petra suffered physical injury in the initial collision, and the infection is a further physical injury arising from treatment of the original wound. Although the specific mechanism (negligent bone-setting leading to infection) may not have been foreseeable in precise detail, the general category of harm—physical injury—was clearly foreseeable.

Foreseeable type of harm: YES
3
Step 3 — Analyze the Intervening Cause

Dr. Epsilon's medical malpractice is an intervening cause. Is it foreseeable? Courts consistently hold that subsequent medical malpractice is a foreseeable intervening cause because it is a natural consequence of the initial injury—injured plaintiffs will seek medical treatment, and some risk of negligent treatment is inherent in that process. Therefore, Dr. Epsilon's negligence does not constitute a superseding cause.

Intervening cause is foreseeable: Does NOT break chain
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Step 4 — Conclusion on Petra's Claim

Delta's negligence is the proximate cause of Petra's infection. The type of harm (physical injury) was foreseeable, and the intervening medical malpractice was itself foreseeable. Delta is liable for Petra's full damages, including those resulting from the infection.

Proximate cause: ESTABLISHED — Delta is liable to Petra

Foreseeability Analysis: Gamma's Claim (Fire Damage from Gasoline Spill)

1
Step 1 — Establish Cause-in-Fact

But for Delta's negligent collision, the gasoline would not have spilled at the intersection. The spill was a necessary condition for the fire. Therefore, Delta's negligence is a cause-in-fact of Gamma's fire damage.

Cause-in-fact: ESTABLISHED
2
Step 2 — Identify the Type of Harm

The type of harm is property damage from fire. A negligent collision involving motor vehicles creates a foreseeable risk that fuel may leak and ignite. Fire damage is within the general category of risks associated with automobile collisions.

Foreseeable type of harm: YES (fire from gasoline is a known risk of collisions)
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Step 3 — Analyze the Intervening Cause

Franco's act of discarding a lit cigarette into the gasoline spill is an intervening cause. This is a potentially superseding cause because it involves a third party's volitional act. However, the analysis turns on foreseeability: was it foreseeable that a passerby might inadvertently or negligently introduce an ignition source to an exposed gasoline spill on a public road? Many courts would find this foreseeable, particularly if the spill was in a trafficked area where people commonly smoke. Conversely, if Franco intentionally ignited the spill, that deliberate act would more likely qualify as superseding.

Context-dependent: If negligent, likely foreseeable; if intentional, likely superseding
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Step 4 — Conclusion on Gamma's Claim

If Franco's act was merely negligent (carelessly tossing a cigarette), proximate cause is likely established because the type of harm (fire from gasoline) was foreseeable and the intervening act was not extraordinary. If Franco deliberately set the fire, most courts would find a superseding cause, breaking the chain of proximate causation between Delta and Gamma.

Proximate cause: LIKELY ESTABLISHED if Franco was negligent; LIKELY SEVERED if Franco was intentional

SECTION 7

Foreseeability Test vs. Direct Cause Test

While the foreseeability test dominates American tort law, it is essential to understand how it compares with the competing direct cause test historically associated with the Andrews dissent in Palsgraf and the English decision in In re Polemis. Understanding the theoretical underpinnings and practical implications of each approach will strengthen your ability to analyze bar exam questions, particularly those that test the boundaries of proximate cause doctrine.

Feature	Foreseeability Test (Cardozo / Majority)	Direct Cause Test (Andrews / Minority)
Central Question	Was the general type of harm foreseeable to a reasonable person?	Was the harm a direct, unbroken consequence of the defendant's negligence—without an intervening, independent cause?
Scope of Liability	Narrower: limits liability to foreseeable consequences and foreseeable plaintiffs.	Broader: extends liability to all direct consequences, regardless of foreseeability.
Relationship to Duty	Intertwines proximate cause with duty analysis; no duty to unforeseeable plaintiffs.	Treats duty as owed to the world at large; proximate cause is a separate, factual inquiry.
Policy Rationale	Fairness to defendants: should not be liable for bizarre, unforeseeable consequences.	Compensation for plaintiffs: every negligent act carries the risk of all its direct effects.
Current Status	Majority rule in American jurisdictions; adopted by Restatement (Second) and (Third).	Minority position; largely rejected after Wagon Mound No. 1 (1961), though some jurisdictions retain elements.

Comparison of the Two Major Proximate Cause Tests

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KEY TAKEAWAY

For bar exam purposes, default to the foreseeability test unless the question specifically indicates a jurisdiction following the direct cause approach. Think of the two tests as lenses with different focal lengths: the foreseeability test zooms in on the particular risk created by the defendant's conduct, asking whether this harm was "in focus" for a reasonable person. The direct cause test uses a wide-angle lens—everything within the unbroken causal frame is captured. The bar examiners overwhelmingly test the foreseeability standard, but awareness of the Andrews/direct cause position helps you identify answer choices designed as distractors.

SECTION 8

Connection to Advanced Tort Theory

The foreseeability framework for proximate cause intersects with several advanced doctrines that may appear on the bar exam or in upper-level courses. Understanding these connections deepens your analytical capacity and prepares you for questions that test the outer boundaries of negligence liability.

Doctrine	Traditional Foreseeability Approach	Advanced / Modern Development
Proximate Cause	Was the type of harm reasonably foreseeable?	Restatement (Third) "scope of liability": Was the harm among the risks that made D's conduct negligent?
Duty	Foreseeability of plaintiff determines duty (Cardozo).	Some jurisdictions collapse duty and proximate cause into a single "scope" inquiry; others maintain them as distinct elements.
Negligence Per Se	If D violated a statute, foreseeability analysis may be modified.	Statutory purpose doctrine: P must be within the class of persons the statute protects, and the harm must be of the type the statute was designed to prevent.
Strict Liability (Products)	Traditional proximate cause analysis applies.	In products liability, courts ask whether the product was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, which parallels proximate cause foreseeability.
Emotional Distress	Zone of danger limits recovery to foreseeable plaintiffs.	Dillon v. Legg factors (CA) expand foreseeability to bystanders based on proximity, relationship, and contemporaneous observation.

Foreseeability in Broader Tort Doctrine

The trend in modern tort law is toward consolidating the various roles of foreseeability under the umbrella of scope of liability. The Restatement (Third) explicitly discourages the use of the term "proximate cause," preferring "scope of liability" to avoid the misleading implication that proximity in time or space is the controlling factor. For the bar exam, you should be conversant in both terminologies—"proximate cause" remains the conventional label on the MBE, but the substance of the inquiry increasingly reflects the Restatement (Third)'s risk-based framework. As you encounter essay questions in jurisdictions that have adopted the Third Restatement, frame your analysis using the scope-of-liability language while demonstrating awareness of the traditional foreseeability vocabulary.

SECTION 9

Practice Problems

Question 1: CONCEPTUAL

Explain the distinction between cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Why is cause-in-fact, standing alone, insufficient to establish negligence liability? What function does foreseeability serve in the proximate cause analysis?

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Cause-in-fact (but-for causation) establishes the factual link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm—it asks whether the injury would have occurred absent the negligence. However, cause-in-fact casts an infinitely wide net: every event in history is a but-for cause of every subsequent event. Proximate cause narrows this universe by imposing a normative limit, filtering out harms that are too remote, bizarre, or attenuated to justify liability. Foreseeability serves as the primary filtering mechanism, limiting liability to those consequences that a reasonable person would have anticipated as probable. This reflects the policy judgment that defendants should not bear the cost of truly unforeseeable outcomes, even when their negligence was a factual cause.

Question 2: BASIC APPLICATION

A store owner negligently fails to clean up a spill in the produce aisle. A customer slips on the spill, falls, and breaks her wrist. Is the store owner's negligence the proximate cause of the broken wrist? Apply the foreseeability test.

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Yes, the store owner's negligence is the proximate cause of the broken wrist. Applying the foreseeability test, the general type of harm—physical injury from slipping—is precisely the kind of risk that makes failing to clean up a spill negligent. A reasonable store owner would foresee that a customer could slip on the spill and suffer an injury such as a broken bone, bruising, or a concussion. The exact nature of the injury (a wrist fracture rather than a hip fracture) need not be foreseeable; only the general category of physical harm from a fall must be within the range of anticipated consequences. There are no intervening causes to consider, as the customer's injury flowed directly from the hazardous condition.

Question 3: INTERMEDIATE

Alpha negligently leaves her car running and unlocked in a parking lot. Beta, a car thief, steals the car and, while speeding away, runs a red light and injures Gamma, a pedestrian. Gamma sues Alpha. Analyze whether Alpha's negligence is the proximate cause of Gamma's injuries, paying particular attention to the intervening criminal act.

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This problem requires careful analysis of the intervening criminal act. Alpha's negligence (leaving the car running and unlocked) is a cause-in-fact of Gamma's injury because but for the unlocked car, Beta could not have easily stolen it and caused the accident. The critical question is whether Beta's criminal theft is a foreseeable intervening cause or a superseding cause. Generally, intentional criminal acts by third parties are superseding because they are independent, volitional decisions. However, an important exception applies: when the defendant's negligence specifically created the risk of the criminal conduct, the criminal act is foreseeable. Here, leaving a car running and unlocked in a public lot creates the specific risk that someone will steal it and drive recklessly. Many jurisdictions have held that this type of criminal conduct is foreseeable, making Alpha liable. The type of harm (physical injury from reckless driving) is clearly foreseeable. Under the Restatement (Third) risk standard, the harm that occurred (injury from a stolen car) was among the very risks that made Alpha's conduct negligent.

Question 4: APPLIED

A construction company negligently leaves an excavation site unfenced adjacent to a public sidewalk. A jogger running at night falls into the excavation and suffers a broken leg. While being treated at the hospital, the jogger has an allergic reaction to a medication administered by a nurse who failed to check the patient's chart for known allergies. The jogger sues the construction company for all injuries, including the allergic reaction. Analyze proximate cause for the allergic-reaction injuries under both the traditional foreseeability test and the Restatement (Third) scope-of-liability framework.

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Under the traditional foreseeability test, the construction company's negligence is the proximate cause of the jogger's initial broken leg—falling into an unfenced excavation site at night is precisely the type of harm a reasonable person would foresee. The allergic reaction from medical malpractice requires further analysis. Subsequent medical malpractice is a well-established foreseeable intervening cause because injured persons will seek medical treatment, and some risk of negligent treatment is inherent. The nurse's failure to check the chart is negligent, not intentional or extraordinary, and therefore does not constitute a superseding cause. The type of harm (physical injury/adverse medical consequence) is foreseeable, even though the precise mechanism (allergic reaction) was not anticipated. Under the Restatement (Third), the analysis asks whether the allergic reaction was among the risks that made the construction company's failure to fence the excavation negligent. The purpose of fencing is to prevent physical injuries; the need for medical treatment—and its attendant risks—is a natural consequence of falling into an excavation. Therefore, the allergic reaction falls within the scope of liability under both frameworks, and the construction company is liable for all injuries.

Question 5: CRITICAL THINKING

In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (1928), Judge Andrews dissented, arguing that every person owes a duty of care to the world at large and that proximate cause should be analyzed through a "direct cause" lens rather than foreseeability. Critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Andrews position. In what circumstances might the Andrews approach produce more just outcomes than the Cardozo foreseeability framework? Are there situations where it would produce less just outcomes? How does the Restatement (Third) attempt to reconcile these tensions?

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The Andrews position offers a broader basis for plaintiff recovery, grounded in the intuition that a negligent actor should bear responsibility for all direct consequences of wrongful conduct rather than escaping liability merely because the precise chain of events was unusual. This approach has appeal in situations where victims suffer real harm traceable to identifiable negligence but cannot satisfy the foreseeability requirement—for example, where the type of harm was foreseeable but the plaintiff was outside the "zone of danger." Andrews's framework might produce more just outcomes in mass-disaster scenarios (explosions, toxic spills) where the geographic reach of harm extends beyond what any reasonable person might predict. However, the Andrews approach risks expanding liability to an unmanageable degree: without foreseeability as a limiting principle, defendants face exposure for consequences so remote that imposing liability serves neither deterrence nor fairness. The Restatement (Third) attempts to reconcile these tensions through the "scope of liability" framework, which retains foreseeability's limiting function while sharpening the analysis by tying liability to the specific risks that made the conduct tortious—rather than using foreseeability as a vague, all-purpose inquiry. This approach acknowledges Andrews's concern that "proximate cause" language obscures the policy judgments at stake, while preserving Cardozo's fundamental insight that liability must have principled limits.

SUMMARY

Summary — Proximate Cause & Foreseeability

Summary

Proximate cause operates as a normative limit on tort liability, filtering out consequences that are too remote or bizarre to justify holding the defendant responsible. The dominant framework is the foreseeability test, which asks whether a reasonable person would have anticipated the general type of harm that occurred. The precise mechanism, manner, or extent of injury need not be foreseeable—only the broad category of risk. When an intervening cause operates between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's harm, the court must determine whether that intervening force was foreseeable (preserving proximate cause) or superseding (severing it). The eggshell-skull rule provides that once the type of harm is foreseeable, the defendant is liable for the full extent of injury, even if aggravated by the plaintiff's preexisting vulnerabilities.

The Restatement (Third) reframes proximate cause as "scope of liability," asking whether the harm was among the risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent—a refinement of foreseeability rather than a replacement. For bar exam preparation, apply the foreseeability test by default: identify the type of harm, assess whether it was foreseeable, analyze any intervening causes for foreseeability, and invoke the eggshell-skull rule when the plaintiff's injuries are unexpectedly severe. This structured approach will guide you confidently through even the most complex proximate cause questions.