Attempt Liability — Apply attempt doctrine - Bar Exam Uniform

SECTION 1

Historical Context & Motivation

The doctrine of criminal attempt addresses a fundamental tension in criminal law: at what point does the state's interest in preventing harm justify punishing conduct that has not yet resulted in a completed offense? Early English common law was reluctant to punish incomplete crimes, focusing instead on consummated harms. However, as the criminal justice system matured, courts recognized that individuals who demonstrated a firm commitment to criminal activity posed a danger to public safety that warranted intervention before the target offense was completed. The evolution of attempt doctrine reflects a broader shift from a purely harm-based model of criminal liability to one that also accounts for culpable intent and dangerous proximity to harm.

1784 • Rex v. Scofield

One of the earliest English cases recognizing attempt as a distinct criminal offense. The court held that an intent to commit a felony, coupled with an overt act toward its commission, could be punished even though the underlying crime was not completed.

1801 • Rex v. Higgins

The court solidified the principle that solicitation to commit a crime could itself constitute criminal conduct, further expanding the scope of inchoate liability and reinforcing that the criminal law could reach conduct short of a completed offense.

1855 • People v. Murray (California)

An influential American decision establishing the 'last act' approach, requiring the defendant to have done everything within their power to commit the crime. This highly restrictive test was later supplanted in many jurisdictions.

1901 • Dangerous Proximity Doctrine

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the 'dangerous proximity' test in Commonwealth v. Peaslee, asking whether the defendant's acts were dangerously close to completion of the target crime. This test balanced the policy of early intervention against the risk of punishing mere preparation.

1962 • Model Penal Code § 5.01

The American Law Institute promulgated its 'substantial step' test, which broadened attempt liability by focusing on whether the defendant's conduct strongly corroborated criminal purpose. This became the dominant modern approach and influenced the majority of American jurisdictions.

The central doctrinal question that attempt liability addresses remains as pressing today as it was in the eighteenth century: where does mere preparation end and criminal attempt begin? Different jurisdictions have answered this question through a variety of tests, each reflecting distinct policy priorities regarding deterrence, incapacitation, and individual liberty. Understanding the historical development of these tests is essential to applying attempt doctrine on the bar exam, where you may be asked to analyze a fact pattern under common law, the Model Penal Code, or both.

SECTION 2

Core Principles & Definitions

Criminal attempt is classified as an inchoate offense — a crime defined by incomplete conduct directed toward a target offense. Attempt liability requires proof of two core components: a mens rea element (the specific intent to commit the target crime) and an actus reus element (some act beyond mere preparation that moves toward completion of that crime). The precise formulation of the actus reus requirement is the central source of doctrinal variation across jurisdictions.

Specific Intent Requirement

Attempt is a specific intent crime regardless of the mens rea of the target offense. Even if the target crime requires only recklessness or negligence, the defendant must intend to commit the acts constituting that crime. For example, attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill, even though certain forms of murder (e.g., depraved-heart murder) require only extreme recklessness.

Beyond Mere Preparation

All jurisdictions agree that the defendant must take some action beyond mere preparation. Thinking about committing a crime, researching methods, or acquiring tools may constitute preparation but typically falls short of attempt. The dividing line between preparation and attempt is the core analytical challenge and the subject of multiple competing tests.

Merger Doctrine

If the target crime is completed, the attempt merges into the completed offense. The defendant cannot be convicted of both the attempt and the completed crime. This reflects the principle that attempt is a lesser included offense of the target crime.

Impossibility Defenses

Courts distinguish between factual impossibility (not a defense) and legal impossibility (traditionally a defense). Factual impossibility exists when the crime cannot be completed due to circumstances unknown to the defendant (e.g., picking an empty pocket). Legal impossibility exists when the completed act would not constitute a crime.

Abandonment / Renunciation

Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant may assert an affirmative defense of voluntary renunciation if the abandonment was complete and voluntary — not motivated by a decision to postpone the crime, choose a different victim, or flee because of an increased risk of detection. The common law traditionally did not recognize abandonment as a defense to attempt.

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KEY TAKEAWAY

Think of attempt liability like an airport security checkpoint. A person who merely thinks about smuggling contraband has committed no crime — that is pure intent without action. A person who purchases a suitcase with a hidden compartment is engaging in preparation. But a person who approaches the security line with the contraband concealed in the suitcase has arguably crossed the line from preparation into attempt. The precise location of the 'checkpoint' — the point at which preparation becomes attempt — is exactly where the competing doctrinal tests diverge.

SECTION 3

Visual Explanation — The Preparation-Attempt Spectrum

This diagram illustrates the four major tests for distinguishing preparation from attempt, arranged from narrowest (Last Act) to broadest (MPC Substantial Step). The colored dots on each line show where each test draws the dividing line along the preparation-to-completion continuum. Notice how the MPC substantial step test allows prosecution at a much earlier stage of criminal conduct than the last act test.

As the diagram makes clear, the choice of doctrinal test has profound consequences for the scope of criminal liability. Under the last act test, a defendant who has taken every step except the final act of commission — such as loading a firearm and aiming it but not yet pulling the trigger — might still be guilty only of preparation. By contrast, under the MPC substantial step test, the same defendant might be liable for attempt much earlier, perhaps at the point of purchasing the weapon and conducting surveillance on the intended victim, provided these acts strongly corroborate criminal purpose. On the bar exam, you must identify which test applies and then apply its specific criteria to the facts presented.

SECTION 4

Doctrinal Framework — The Actus Reus Tests in Detail

The Four Major Tests for Attempt Actus Reus

While all jurisdictions agree that attempt requires specific intent plus an overt act beyond mere preparation, they diverge significantly on what constitutes a sufficient overt act. The four major tests — each reflecting different policy concerns — are analyzed below.

1. The Last Act Test

The last act test requires that the defendant must have performed every act necessary to bring about the intended result, with only the final consequence remaining beyond the defendant's control. Under this approach, attempt liability attaches at the latest possible moment — essentially when the defendant has done everything in their power and the crime's completion depends only on external circumstances. This test is extremely narrow and has been largely abandoned in modern jurisdictions because it provides law enforcement with virtually no window for preventive intervention.

2. The Dangerous Proximity Test (Holmes)

Articulated by Justice Holmes, the dangerous proximity test asks whether the defendant's conduct is dangerously close to success, considering three factors: the gravity of the offense, the nearness of the act to completion, and the probability that the conduct will result in the target crime. This balancing approach gives courts more flexibility than the last act test, as it permits consideration of the seriousness of the threatened harm. A defendant who is dangerously close to detonating a bomb may be guilty of attempt at an earlier stage than one who is close to committing a minor theft, reflecting the greater urgency of preventing catastrophic harm.

3. The Unequivocality (Res Ipsa Loquitur) Test

The unequivocality test focuses on whether the defendant's acts, viewed in the abstract, unambiguously manifest a criminal purpose. Under this approach, the conduct itself must 'speak for itself' (res ipsa loquitur) as demonstrating criminal intent. If an observer could reasonably interpret the defendant's actions as consistent with lawful conduct, the acts remain mere preparation. This test has been criticized for being impractical, as most real-world conduct is ambiguous until very late in the sequence of events, effectively collapsing it into something close to the last act test in many applications.

4. The Substantial Step Test (Model Penal Code § 5.01)

The substantial step test under the MPC requires that the defendant's conduct constitute a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in commission of the crime and that this step be strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. The MPC enumerates several categories of conduct that may constitute a substantial step, including lying in wait, reconnoitering the contemplated scene of the crime, unlawful entry of a structure where the crime is to be committed, and possession of materials with no lawful purpose that are to be used in the commission of the crime. This is the broadest test and the one most frequently tested on the Uniform Bar Exam.

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BAR EXAM TIP

When a bar exam question asks you to analyze attempt, first identify the applicable test. If the question references the Model Penal Code, apply the substantial step test. If the question specifies 'common law,' consider whether the dangerous proximity or unequivocality test is more appropriate given the facts. Always begin your analysis by confirming that the defendant possessed the specific intent to commit the target offense before moving to the actus reus analysis.

SECTION 5

Defenses to Attempt — Impossibility & Abandonment

Two major categories of defenses arise in attempt cases: impossibility and abandonment. Each operates differently depending on whether the jurisdiction follows common law principles or the Model Penal Code, and bar exam questions frequently test the distinction between factual and legal impossibility. Understanding these defenses requires careful attention to the interplay between the defendant's subjective beliefs and objective reality.

This decision tree maps the analytical pathway for evaluating defenses to attempt. Start at the top with the charge, then determine whether impossibility or abandonment is at issue. The factual vs. legal impossibility distinction is critical at common law, while the MPC largely eliminates it. Abandonment is only a defense under the MPC if the renunciation was complete and voluntary.

Defense	Common Law	Model Penal Code
Factual Impossibility	Not a defense. D is liable if the crime would have been completed but for a circumstance unknown to D (e.g., the victim was already dead).	Not a defense. The MPC focuses on D's culpability and what D believed the facts to be, not on what actually happened.
Legal Impossibility	Valid defense. If D's completed conduct would not have constituted a crime, there is no criminal attempt. This is sometimes called 'true legal impossibility.'	Generally not a defense. The MPC eliminates the distinction between factual and legal impossibility, though 'true legal impossibility' (where the target act is not a crime at all) remains a defense by definition.
Abandonment / Renunciation	Generally not a defense. Once the line from preparation to attempt is crossed, the crime is complete and abandonment cannot undo it.	Affirmative defense if the abandonment was complete and voluntary — reflecting a genuine change of heart, not caused by an increased risk of detection or a decision to postpone.
Inherent Impossibility	Some courts treat inherently impossible attempts (e.g., attempting murder by voodoo) as not punishable, reasoning that the defendant poses no real danger.	The MPC permits courts to dismiss or reduce charges when the defendant's conduct is 'so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of a crime' that it does not warrant punishment.

Comparison of Attempt Defenses Under Common Law and MPC

SECTION 6

Worked Example — Applying Attempt Doctrine

Consider the following fact pattern, which tests the core elements of attempt liability under both common law and the MPC.

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FACT PATTERN

David plans to rob a bank. Over the course of two weeks, he purchases a ski mask and a replica firearm, studies the bank's layout by visiting it several times as a customer, and writes a demand note. On the planned day, David drives to the bank, parks in the lot, puts on the ski mask, and places the replica firearm in his waistband. As he walks toward the bank entrance, he is arrested by police officers who had been tipped off about his plan. David has not yet entered the bank. Analyze David's liability for attempted robbery under (a) common law dangerous proximity test and (b) the MPC substantial step test.

Analysis of David's Attempted Robbery

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Step 1 — Identify the Mens Rea

Attempt is a specific intent crime. David's conduct over two weeks — purchasing disguise materials, acquiring a replica weapon, studying the bank's layout, and writing a demand note — clearly demonstrates a specific intent to commit robbery. His plan was deliberate, sustained, and directed at a particular target. The mens rea element is satisfied under either approach.

Mens rea: Satisfied — David possessed the specific intent to commit robbery.
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Step 2 — Apply the Common Law Dangerous Proximity Test

Under the dangerous proximity test, we consider: (1) the nearness of the act to completion, (2) the gravity of the offense, and (3) the probability that the conduct would result in the crime. David was in the bank's parking lot, masked and armed, walking toward the entrance. He had not yet entered the bank or presented the demand note. A court applying this test would weigh the seriousness of robbery (a violent felony) and David's very close proximity to completion. While he had not yet confronted a teller, he was arguably within seconds of doing so. The gravity of the offense tips the balance toward finding dangerous proximity even without the final acts of entry and demand.

Dangerous Proximity: Likely satisfied — David's conduct was dangerously close to completion of a serious felony, though a court might find this a close case since he had not yet entered the bank.
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Step 3 — Apply the MPC Substantial Step Test

Under MPC § 5.01, a substantial step must strongly corroborate the actor's criminal purpose. The MPC provides illustrative categories of conduct that may constitute a substantial step. David's conduct maps onto several: reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime (his multiple visits to study the layout), possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime (the ski mask and replica firearm), and arriving at the scene in disguise. Each of these acts, when combined, strongly corroborates David's criminal purpose and goes well beyond mere preparation.

Substantial Step: Clearly satisfied — David's conduct constitutes multiple substantial steps strongly corroborative of criminal purpose.
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Step 4 — Consider Defenses

David was arrested before he could enter the bank. Could he claim abandonment? No — David did not voluntarily abandon his plan. He was stopped by police intervention, which is an external force rather than a genuine change of heart. Even under the MPC's abandonment defense, renunciation must be complete and voluntary, not prompted by an increased risk of detection. There is no impossibility issue here, as the crime could have been completed but for the police intervention.

No valid defense — neither abandonment nor impossibility applies on these facts.
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Step 5 — Conclusion

David is likely guilty of attempted robbery under both the common law dangerous proximity test and the MPC substantial step test. The analysis is more straightforward under the MPC, which finds attempt liability at an earlier stage. Under the common law test, the result might depend on whether the court emphasizes that David had not yet entered the bank or, alternatively, that he was within moments of doing so while carrying out a serious felony.

Guilty of attempted robbery under both tests, with stronger support under the MPC substantial step analysis.

SECTION 7

Comparing the Actus Reus Tests — Strengths & Limitations

Each of the four major tests for attempt actus reus represents a different balance between protecting individual liberty (by limiting criminal liability to conduct very near completion) and protecting public safety (by permitting intervention at earlier stages). The following table compares the tests along several analytical dimensions that are frequently tested on the bar exam.

Test	Scope of Liability	Policy Rationale	Key Limitation
Last Act	Narrowest. Liability only when D has done everything possible to complete the crime.	Maximizes individual liberty; prevents punishment for equivocal conduct.	Allows no room for law enforcement intervention. Virtually impossible to prevent harm before it occurs.
Dangerous Proximity	Moderate. Considers proximity, gravity, and probability.	Balances prevention against liberty; weights seriousness of the target offense.	Subjective, fact-specific inquiry can lead to inconsistent results across cases.
Unequivocality	Moderate to narrow. Acts must unambiguously manifest criminal purpose.	Protects D whose conduct is ambiguous; focuses on objective manifestation.	Most conduct is ambiguous until very late. Collapses in practice toward the last act test.
Substantial Step (MPC)	Broadest. Liability attaches when D takes a step strongly corroborating intent.	Maximizes public safety; enables early intervention; focuses on D's dangerousness.	Risk of overcriminalization; may punish conduct that some would consider mere preparation.

Comparative Analysis of Attempt Actus Reus Tests

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KEY TAKEAWAY

Think of the four tests as representing different philosophies of policing. The last act test is analogous to a firefighter who only responds after the fire has fully started — maximum damage occurs before intervention. The dangerous proximity test is like a firefighter who responds when smoke is visible. The unequivocality test responds when the conduct could only be interpreted as arson. The MPC substantial step test is like a firefighter who responds when someone is spotted carrying gasoline and matches toward a building — the earliest intervention, based on strong indicators of intent. Each approach has merit, but the trend in American law has been toward the MPC's earlier intervention model.

SECTION 8

Connection to Related Inchoate Offenses

Attempt liability does not exist in isolation. It is one of three inchoate offenses recognized in criminal law, alongside solicitation and conspiracy. Understanding how these offenses relate to one another — and how they differ in terms of mens rea, actus reus, and available defenses — is essential for comprehensive bar exam preparation. Additionally, attempt doctrine intersects with concepts such as complicity (aiding and abetting) and substantive offense grading, making it a foundational concept in criminal law.

Dimension	Attempt	Solicitation	Conspiracy
Actus Reus	Substantial step (MPC) or act beyond mere preparation (CL) toward commission of a crime.	Asking, encouraging, or commanding another person to commit a crime.	Agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime, plus (in most jurisdictions) an overt act in furtherance.
Mens Rea	Specific intent to commit the target offense.	Specific intent that the solicited person commit the target offense.	Intent to agree and intent to achieve the criminal objective.
Merger	Merges into the completed offense. D cannot be convicted of both attempt and the completed crime.	Merges into the completed offense or attempt if the solicitee acts on the request.	Does NOT merge. D can be convicted of both conspiracy and the completed target offense.
Abandonment	MPC: Affirmative defense if voluntary and complete. CL: Generally no defense.	MPC: Defense if D persuades the solicitee not to commit the crime or otherwise prevents it.	MPC: Defense if D thwarts the success of the conspiracy. CL: Withdrawal may limit liability for future acts of co-conspirators but does not eliminate conspiracy liability.
Punishment	CL: One grade lower than the target offense. MPC: Same grade as the target offense (except for first-degree felonies).	Typically punished at a lower grade than the target offense.	Varies by jurisdiction. Often punished at the same level as the target offense.

Attempt vs. Solicitation vs. Conspiracy

A critical distinction to remember is that conspiracy does not merge with the completed offense, while attempt and solicitation do. This means a defendant can be convicted of both conspiracy to commit murder and murder itself, but cannot be convicted of both attempted murder and murder. On the bar exam, questions testing the merger doctrine often appear in conjunction with attempt analysis, requiring you to determine whether the defendant should be charged with attempt, the completed offense, or both.

SECTION 9

Practice Problems

Question 1: CONCEPTUAL

Why is attempt always classified as a specific intent crime, even when the target offense requires a lesser mens rea (such as recklessness or negligence)? Explain the doctrinal and policy reasons for this requirement.

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Attempt requires specific intent because the essence of the crime is the defendant's purposeful pursuit of a criminal objective that has not yet been achieved. Without requiring intent, the law would risk punishing individuals for mere reckless or negligent acts that did not produce any harmful result — a significant expansion of criminal liability. The specific intent requirement serves as a safeguard ensuring that only those who genuinely aimed to commit the target crime are punished for failing to do so. For instance, one cannot 'attempt' involuntary manslaughter because that crime, by definition, involves an unintentional killing; it would be logically contradictory to say someone intentionally tried to unintentionally kill another person. The specific intent requirement thus reflects both logical coherence and the policy concern of limiting inchoate liability to truly culpable actors.

Question 2: BASIC APPLICATION

Sarah wants to poison her neighbor's dog. She purchases rat poison and mixes it into a meatball. She places the meatball in her refrigerator, intending to throw it into her neighbor's yard the next morning. She is arrested that night after her roommate reports her plan. Under the MPC substantial step test, has Sarah committed attempted destruction of property (assuming poisoning a dog constitutes that offense)?

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Under the MPC substantial step test, Sarah must have taken a step that (1) constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the crime and (2) is strongly corroborative of her criminal purpose. Sarah's actions — purchasing poison specifically to harm the dog, preparing the poisoned meatball, and storing it with the stated intention of deploying it the next morning — likely constitute a substantial step. Her preparation of the instrumentality of the crime (the poisoned meatball) fits the MPC's illustrative category of 'possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, that are specially designed for such unlawful use or that can serve no lawful purpose of the actor.' However, a counterargument exists that she had not yet taken the step of deploying the meatball and could have changed her mind. Under the MPC's broad approach, most courts would likely find this sufficient for attempt liability, particularly given the strong corroboration of criminal purpose through her statements to the roommate.

Question 3: INTERMEDIATE

Carlos plans to burglarize a jewelry store. He cases the store for two weeks, obtains blueprints of the building, purchases glass-cutting tools, and rents a van to use as a getaway vehicle. On the night of the planned burglary, Carlos drives to the store and parks the van in the alley behind it. He begins to unload his tools but then sees a security guard he did not expect. Carlos puts the tools back in the van and drives home, deciding to abandon the plan entirely because he feels guilty about stealing. Analyze Carlos's liability under both common law and the MPC, including any applicable defenses.

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Under the MPC substantial step test, Carlos likely committed attempted burglary. His extensive preparation — casing the store, obtaining blueprints, purchasing specialized tools, renting a getaway van, driving to the scene, and beginning to unload tools — constitutes a substantial step strongly corroborative of criminal purpose. Multiple MPC illustrative categories apply: reconnoitering, possession of materials for unlawful use, and potentially lying in wait. However, Carlos may assert the affirmative defense of voluntary renunciation under MPC § 5.01(4). The key question is whether his abandonment was truly voluntary. Although he noticed the security guard (an external factor), the facts state he abandoned the plan because he felt guilty. If the guilt was the motivating factor rather than fear of the guard, this could qualify as voluntary renunciation. A court would need to assess whether the guard's presence merely triggered a preexisting moral doubt or instead was the primary cause of his decision. Under common law, the analysis differs in two ways: (1) the dangerous proximity test might yield a closer question on actus reus since Carlos had not yet approached the building itself, and (2) abandonment is generally not a defense at common law, meaning even his genuine remorse would not absolve him if the attempt was already complete.

Question 4: APPLIED

Detective Moore poses as a drug dealer and sells baking soda to Defendant Dan, who believes he is purchasing cocaine. Dan pays $5,000 for the baking soda, intending to resell it as cocaine. Dan is arrested and charged with attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Dan's attorney argues that the crime was impossible because the substance was not actually cocaine. Evaluate this defense under both common law and the MPC.

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Dan's defense raises the issue of factual impossibility. Dan intended to possess and distribute cocaine, and he believed the substance was cocaine, but due to circumstances unknown to him (the police sting), the substance was actually baking soda. Under both common law and the MPC, factual impossibility is not a valid defense to attempt. At common law, the rationale is that Dan demonstrated the requisite mens rea and took acts beyond mere preparation; the fact that external circumstances prevented completion does not negate his culpability. Under the MPC, the analysis is even more straightforward: § 5.01(1)(a) provides that a person is guilty of attempt if he purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime 'if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be.' Since Dan believed he was purchasing cocaine, his conduct satisfies the MPC standard regardless of the substance's true nature. Dan might alternatively argue legal impossibility — that possessing baking soda is not a crime — but this argument fails because the impossibility is purely factual: the legal prohibition against cocaine possession exists, and it was only a factual circumstance (the substitution of baking soda) that prevented the completed offense. True legal impossibility would require that Dan's intended conduct, even if completed exactly as planned, would not constitute any crime.

Question 5: CRITICAL THINKING

Consider whether the MPC's substantial step test, by broadening attempt liability, creates tension with constitutional principles — specifically, the First Amendment's protection of speech and thought, and the Due Process Clause's requirement of fair notice. Could a defendant argue that the substantial step test punishes thoughts and intentions rather than completed harmful acts? Discuss the constitutional boundaries of inchoate liability and how courts balance public safety against individual liberty in this context.

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This question engages the fundamental tension underlying all inchoate liability: the state's interest in preventing harm before it occurs versus the individual's right to be free from punishment for mere thoughts or lawful preparatory acts. The MPC's substantial step test does not punish thoughts alone — it requires an overt act — but by allowing prosecution at earlier stages than the common law tests, it increases the risk that ambiguous conduct could be treated as criminal. The First Amendment concern is most acute when the 'substantial step' involves expressive conduct, such as writing a threatening letter or making statements about criminal plans. Courts have generally held that the specific intent requirement adequately distinguishes punishable attempt from protected speech: the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant genuinely intended to commit the target crime, not merely that the defendant spoke about it. The Due Process concern relates to fair notice: can a reasonable person understand at what point their conduct crosses from lawful preparation into criminal attempt? The MPC addresses this through its illustrative list of substantial steps, which provides concrete guidance. However, the open-ended nature of the 'strongly corroborative' standard means that the line between preparation and attempt remains somewhat unclear, potentially raising vagueness concerns in edge cases. Courts have largely upheld the substantial step test against constitutional challenges, reasoning that the combination of specific intent and an overt act provides sufficient safeguards, but scholars continue to debate whether this standard adequately protects individual liberty.

SUMMARY

Lesson Summary

Summary

Criminal attempt liability requires two elements: the specific intent to commit the target offense and an overt act beyond mere preparation. The precise boundary between preparation and attempt varies by jurisdiction. The last act test is the narrowest, requiring the defendant to have done everything possible. The dangerous proximity test evaluates nearness to completion, gravity, and probability. The unequivocality test asks whether the acts unambiguously manifest criminal purpose. The MPC substantial step test is the broadest, requiring only a step strongly corroborative of criminal purpose, and is the dominant modern approach tested on the Uniform Bar Exam.

Key defenses include factual impossibility (not a defense under either approach), legal impossibility (a defense at common law but largely eliminated by the MPC), and voluntary abandonment (an MPC affirmative defense if the renunciation is complete and voluntary, but generally unavailable at common law). Remember that attempt merges into the completed offense — unlike conspiracy, which does not merge. When analyzing an attempt question, always begin with the mens rea (specific intent), then apply the appropriate actus reus test, and finally evaluate any applicable defenses.